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Drifting Through Byzantium:
The Promise and Failure of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
Robert M. Gordont
Over little opposition, Congress last session enacted the
first overhaul of federal child welfare law since 1980, the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA). Lead sponsors in
the Senate included conservative Republican Mike DeWine,
moderate Republican John Chafee, and liberal Democrat Jay
Rockefeller.2 Both the conservative Heritage Foundation and
the liberal Children's Defense Fund endorsed ASFA.3 The
House approved the bill in its final form by a vote of 406 to 7. 4
The Senate did not even call the roll.5
ASFA's supporters praised the law for putting "the safety
and health of the child first."6 Signing it, President Clinton de-
t Law Clerk to The Honorable Pierre N. Leval, United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit. This Article originated in a course on social insur-
ance taught by Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw. On reading a draft, Pro-
fessors Graetz and Mashaw were kind enough to give me helpful comments
(and credit) even though the topic had little to do with the class. I also wish
to thank Jill Duerr-Berrick, Peter Edelman, Abbe Gluck, Joseph Goldstein,
Jennifer Klein, and Carol Williams for discussing various aspects of the child
welfare system with me. Finally, I am grateful to Jean Koh Peters for en-
riching my understanding of the needs of children in foster care more than I
can say. Arguments and errors are my responsibility.
1. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
2. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,668 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Craig). In the House, the lead sponsors were Representatives Dave
Camp (R-Mich.) and Barbara Kennelly (D-Conn.). See id. at S12,669 (daily ed.
Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. DeWine).
3. See id. at H2022 (daily ed. April 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Ken-
nelly).
4. See id. at H10,776 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
5. See id. at S12,198 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997).
6. Id. at S12,526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee)
(stating that the law "will put the safety and health of the child first" and re-
ject "the current system of always putting the needs and rights of the biologi-
cal parents first"); id. at S12,673 (statement of Sen. Craig) ("While the re-
forms in the bill respect the rights of others-such as birth parents, relatives,
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clared that ASFA would "fundamentally... improve the well-
being of hundreds of thousands of our most vulnerable chil-
dren."7 A few newspaper columnists went further, heralding a
children's "revolution"8 that would be "to the abused and ne-
glected children in our nation's foster-care system what the
Voting Rights Act was to black Americans in 1965."9
There is little question that America's abused and ne-
glected children could use a revolution. "[Miost people who
know about the child welfare and child protective system in
this country know that this system is in crisis." 0 Children of-
ten spend years in care, bouncing from foster home to biological
home and back, repeatedly suffering abuse, and finally drifting
toward adulthood as orphans in fact if not in law." The Na-
tional Commission on Children concluded that "[i]f the nation
had deliberately designed a system that would.., abandon the
children who depend on it, it could not have done a better job
than the present child welfare system."'12
Though most of ASFA's supporters did not promise revolu-
tion, they did pledge three important reforms. First, ASFA
foster families, and adoptive parents-it makes clear that the focus must al-
ways be on the child's health and safety"); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 8(1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740 ("[T]here seems to be a
growing belief that Federal statutes, the social work profession, and the
courts sometimes err on the side of protecting the rights of parents."); 143
CONG. REC. S3947 (daily ed. May 5, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine) ("[Wie
have to start worrying about the children's rights and less about the rights of
the natural parents."); id. at H2021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Hoyer) ("Our child welfare system too often protects parents' rights
rather than children's rights.").
7. Remarks on Signing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1863, 1864 (Nov. 19, 1997).
8. R. Bruce Dold, Giving Kids a Little More 'Wiggle Room', CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 12, 1997, at 27.
9. Jeff Katz, Finally the Law Puts These Kids' Interests First, MIL-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 28, 1997, at 1.
10. Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 104th Cong. 9 (1996)
[hereinafter Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children](testimony of Dr. Richard J. Gelles); see also 143 CONG. REC. S12,672 (daily
ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (stating that the system is in
"crisis"); id. at S9652 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller)(same); Child Welfare Waiver Demonstrations, 60 Fed. Reg. 31,478, 31,478
(1995) (same); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES:
COMPLEX NEEDS REQUIRE NEW STRATEGIES 2 (1997) (same).
1L See infra Parts L.A-B.
12. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW
AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 293 (1991).
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would protect children's health and safety by ensuring that
states do not make so-called "reasonable efforts" to return fos-
ter children to dangerous households. 13 Second, the Act would
reduce "foster care drift," enabling children to return to their
homes or move to other permanent placements more quickly.14
Third, ASFA would increase the number of children moving
from foster care to adoption.15 ASFA's advances toward these
goals constituted a "historic change" in federal law.16
Because the child welfare system is so troubled, and be-
cause Congress's goals are generally good ones, it is sad that
ASFA cannot begin to fulfill most of these promises. Specifi-
cally, though ASFA may stop inappropriate "reasonable ef-
forts" to the extent they occur, it will not do much to reduce fos-
ter care drift or increase adoptions. This Article offers a
detailed analysis of ASFA's shortcomings and a proposal for re-
form.
ASFA's incapacity to reduce drift or promote adoptions has
two sources. For all their rhetorical commitment to child wel-
fare, supporters of ASFA ultimately did not tailor key provi-
sions of the law to children's interests. At critical junctures,
ASFA either places adult interests first deliberately, or ignores
children's needs carelessly. Parts of ASFA that could have in-
duced states to move children toward permanent placement in-
stead send an ambiguous message that may have few positive
effects.
Beyond these errors in design, ASFA also reflects a
broader failure of nerve: the failure to seek structural reform.
The child welfare system is a federal-state partnership, and
the state agencies that implement ASFA retain great discre-
tion in that implementation. Yet state agencies have few in-
13. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen. DeWine) (stating that ASFA would "save lives"); id. at S12,673
(statement of Sen. Craig) (same). For a definition and discussion of
"reasonable efforts," see infra Parts I.A., M.L
14. See 143 CONG. REC. H10,787 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Kennelly) ("This legislation we can all agree on is putting children on a
fast track from foster care to safe and loving and permanent homes."); id- at
H10,788 (statement of Rep. Camp) ("This bill will ensure that a permanent,
loving home is within the reach of every child."); id. at S12,671 (statement of
Sen. Rockefeller) (saying that the bill would "move children out of foster care
and into adoptive and other permanent homes more quickly and more safely
than ever before").
15. See id at S12,670 (statement of Sen. DeWine) (stating that the bill
will "increase adoptions"); id. at S12,673 (statement of Sen. Craig) (same).
16. Id at S12,670 (statement of Sen. DeWine).
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centives to improve their current practices under ASFA. Some
of these incentives to retain the status quo are matters of insti-
tutional culture and competence that federal law can change
only gradually. But one of the incentives to inaction, and one
that discourages positive change, is largely a product of federal
law: a nonsensical financial system that rewards states for
leaving children in foster care. Because ASFA says one thing
but the funding says another, the implementation of ASFA's
flawed provisions is not likely to correct ASFA's flaws.
Although ASFA's effects will not be clear for years, 17 a
Congress committed to the law's goals will likely have to con-
sider further reforms soon.18 To reduce foster care drift and in-
crease adoptions, Congress must correct both of ASFA's fail-
ings, reforming substantive provisions and underlying
incentives. The former task involves several seemingly techni-
cal but highly significant changes. The latter task requires a
major shift in the flow of money from Washington.
It is possible, of course, that Congress will not return to
the child welfare system in the near future. Maybe ASFA's
flaws and silences are not oversights, but calculated reflections
of a philosophy that does not "put children first" after all. Per-
haps Congress is still more concerned about protecting biologi-
cal ties between parents and children, whatever the impact on
children's well-being. Or perhaps Congress simply refuses to
use federal law to reform state bureaucratic practice. Parental
rights and state sovereignty are honorable commitments with
deep roots in American law; if they are Congress's commit-
ments, then ASFA has not failed to achieve its real goals at all.
Without engaging the vast and vexed questions of how to
balance state and federal power or parents' and children's
rights, this Article takes Congress at its word, asking how fed-
eral law could best protect society's most vulnerable children. 19
17. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of
current data collection and analysis).
18. Members of Congress on the left and right acknowledged this during
the debate over ASFA. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,673 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Grassley); id. at S5808 (daily ed. June 17, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Wyden).
19. For the most part, I approach these issues in the spirit of Joseph
Goldstein and his coauthors in their seminal work. They state as a premise
their belief that the interests of children are paramount, but they do not
mount a theoretical defense of that position. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 7,
81-82, 250 n.14 (1996). The preference for children's interests is widely
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Part I places ASFA in context by describing the child welfare
system prior to 1997, then analyzing the new law's aims, re-
quirements, and theoretical rationale. Parts H and I argue
that ASFA will not achieve two of its stated ends: reducing
drift and increasing adoptions. Part H focuses on the failure of
ASFA's substantive provisions consistently to put children's in-
terests first, while Part HI describes the incentives at the state
level, including federal financial incentives, to maintain the
status quo. Part IV offers a battery of reform proposals that
might better align the everyday demands of federal law with
its ideals.
I. CHILDREN FIRST: THE PROMISE OF ASFA
It may be helpful to begin by identifying the "child welfare
services" affected by ASFA. Designed to prevent or address the
consequences of child maltreatment, such services include in-
vestigations of alleged abuse, removals of children from homes,
placements in substitute care, services to prevent abuse or
bring about reunification, and efforts to find alternative per-
manent placements such as adoptions. 20 Child welfare services
are by their nature residual, serving only those children suf-
fering or at great risk of suffering the gravest mistreatment,
rather than the whole population of families in which children
experience serious deprivation.2'
shared in American society. See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against
the Best Interest of the Child, 54 CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987); Robert Pear, Greasy
Kid Stuff. Washington Kidnaps Dick and Jane, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, § 4
(Week in Review), at 1. Defending that preference is a philosophical project
beyond the scope of this Article, although Part V infra does offer a brief
analysis of ASFA from the perspective of parents.
20. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 104TH CONG., 1996
GREEN BOOK 692 (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinafter 1996 GREEN BOOK]; ROB
GEEN & SHELLEY WATERS, THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM ON CHILD
WELFARE FINANCING 1 (1997).
21. Many scholars argue that the residual approach is doomed to fail ab-
sent vast new investments in anti-poverty programs. See MARK E.
COURTNEY, THE FOSTER CARE CRISIS 16 (1994); DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE
WELFARE OF CHILDREN 4-5 (1994); LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF
POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN
THE UNITED STATES (1989). Whether or not this is correct, vast new invest-
ments in fighting poverty are not now forthcoming. See Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996) (cutting $55 billion over 6 years from federal spending on the
poor). As long as the choice is between better and worse residual approaches,
and especially as long as the inferior approaches are so poor, the perfect
should not become the enemy of the barely adequate.
1999]
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ASFA primarily affects the child welfare services designed
to prevent children from entering state care, to protect them
while in care, and to move them out of care. Congress compre-
hensively addressed these matters for the first time with the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Child Wel-
fare Act).22 ASFA has little impact on investigations of abuse
and neglect, which are addressed federally by a law that ASFA
does not amend.2 3 The following discussion first describes the
framework established by the Child Welfare Act and its
amendments, then details the goals, policies, and rationale of
ASFA.
A. BACKGROUND
Federal intervention in state child welfare policy prior to
1980 was surprisingly sparse.24 Well into the twentieth cen-
tury, states, localities, and private organizations shared re-
sponsibility for funding and directing the child welfare sys-
tem.25 Congress became financially involved through the
Social Security Act of 1935, which funded some social work for
destitute families.26 Later amendments of the Social Security
Act in the 1960s and 1970s added federal support for payments
to families of children in foster care27 and for additional social
services.28 Even as federal funding increased, however, states
22. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (amending sections 420-27 and471-79(a) of the Social Security Act) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
23. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07
(1994).
24. See LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLEcT
AND ABUSE IN AMERIcAN HISTORY 101-24 (1997); LELA B. COSTIN ET AL., THE
POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA 82, 97-99 (1996).
25. See ASHBY, supra note 24, at 117; COSTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at
108.
26. See Social Security Act § 521, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, 633(1935); COSTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 108.
27. See Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-31, §§ 2-7, 75
Stat. 75, 76-78 (1961); COSTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 110.
28. See 1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 20, at 688-89. These funds were
eventually consolidated in Title XX of the Social Security Act, which became
the Social Services Block Grant in 1981. See id. at 679; Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 511-19 (1981). Because Title
XX is a fairly unrestricted block grant whose uses states need not report, lim-ited information is available about the proportion of funds spent on child wel-
fare. See 1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 20, at 684. According to a 1990 fed-
eral survey, however, approximately 29% of program funds are used forprotective services for children, preventive services for children and their
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retained tremendous discretion over child welfare policy
through the 1970s.29
The controls on federal funding imposed by the Child Wel-
fare Act of 1980 attempted to address the burgeoning problem
of "foster care drift.30 Congress had learned that record num-
bers of children-more than 500,000-were in foster or other
state care.31 Many of these children lacked any prospect of go-
ing to a permanent home any time soon, and were instead
"drifting" among multiple foster homes for long periods of
time.32 In order to reduce both the number and the length of
foster care stays, the Child Welfare Act sought to "(1) keep
families together whenever possible by providing them with
the services and supports they need, and (2) find permanent
adoptive homes for children who could not be reunited with
their parents."33
families, or substitute care and placement services for children. See id. at
686. In addition, 15 to 25% of funds were used for homemaker services or
counseling, both of which may be geared in large part to the at-risk popula-
tions served by child welfare programs. See id,
29. See H.R. REP. No. 96-136, at 20-36 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1469-85; MaryLee Allen et al., A Guide to the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE
COURTS 575, 576-77 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983).
30. See David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement
in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Fail-
ures of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 158-59 (1992);
Edith Fein & Anthony N. Maluccio, Permanency Planning: Another Remedy in
Jeopardy, 66 SOC. SERv. REv. 335,337 (1992).
31. See S. REP. No. 96-336, at 10, 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459, 1460. The 500,000 figure included all children in substi-
tute care, including institutions and emergency shelters. See id.; ASHBY, su-
pra note 24, at 216 n.40. Like other numbers in the field, this figure should be
viewed with considerable caution. See infra note 91.
32. See S. REP. NO. 96-336, at 10, 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459, 1460 (citing study showing that two-and-one-half years
was the median length of time all children in foster care had spent in care);
COSTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 122-23 (citing studies from late 1970s and
early 1980s showing that 70% of children in foster care had been there for
longer than a year, that 34% had been there for four years or more, and that
53% had had multiple placements).
33. Walter F. Mondale, Foreword to THE ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND
CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1980: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 3-4 (N. Am. Council on
Adoptable Children ed., 1990) [hereinafter THE FIRST TEN YEARS]; see also S.
REP. No. 96-336, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1459, 1459
(agreeing with the view that the law should "move children out of foster care
and into more permanent arrangements by reuniting them with their own
families when this is feasible, or by placing them in adoptive homes").
1999] 643
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To reduce foster care drift, the Child Welfare Act required
states receiving federal child welfare funds to take several
steps. Before receiving reimbursements for foster care mainte-
nance payments, states had to make "reasonable efforts... to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his
home, and.., to make it possible for the child to return to his
home."34 These provisions sought to ensure that foster care
was a "last resort. 35 In addition, states had to maintain indi-
vidualized "case plans" for all children in their care to assure
appropriate placement and services.36 Finally, states had to
set up a "case review system" that among other things guaran-
teed court or administrative reviews at least every six months,
and required a judicial "dispositional hearing" no more than
eighteen months after entry into care.37 Congress envisioned
that the dispositional hearing would generally produce a final
decision about the permanent placement for the child 38-
reunification, adoption, or some form of guardianship-and
that foster care would therefore cease to be a "long-term hold-
ing situation" for most children.39
For states that complied with these requirements, the
Child Welfare Act offered more money for efforts to reduce
stays in foster care. Supporters of the Act secured a large in-
crease in appropriations for the Child Welfare Services pro-
gram under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act.40 Because
states were then spending most of their Title IV-B money on
foster care,41 the law required that new funds be spent on pre-
ventive services.42 In addition, the Act established a new adop-
34 See Child Welfare Act § 101, 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15), 672(a)(1) (1994).
The "reasonable efforts" requirement applies only to children whose foster
care payments are federally reimbursed, i.e., children who would have been
eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. See id. § 622.
35. 126 CONG. REC. S6942 (daily ed. June 13, 1980) (statement of Sen.
Cranston).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1).
37. See id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 96-136, at 50 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1460, 1467.
39. See id.
40. Compare id. (noting that as of 1980, appropriation for Title IV-B had
never exceeded $56.5 million and calling for increased funding) with STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 101ST CONG., 1993 GREEN BOOK 886
(Comm. Print 1993) (showing that appropriation for Title IV-B was $163.5
million in 1981).
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-136, at 11 (1979).
42. See Child Welfare Act § 103,42 U.S.C. § 622 (1994).
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tion assistance entitlement, reimbursing states for payments to
adoptive parents of children eligible for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) who have "special needs" that
make adoption difficult.43 The Act combined this new program
with the existing entitlement reimbursing payments to the fos-
ter families of AFDC-eligible children.44 Congress expected
that the adoption assistance and child welfare services pro-
grams together would provide an impetus to reduce drift.
Within a decade, the foster care population had again ex-
ploded,45 and spending on services to stop such placements had
not begun to keep pace with the growth in caseloads. 46 At the
same time, a new "family preservation" model-brief, inten-
sive, and individualized social work-had become immensely
popular politically, promising to serve families and save money
at the same time.47 In 1993, with the beginning of the new
Clinton Administration, this combination of rising caseloads
and a new services model came together in the one major
change in the framework of the Child Welfare Act prior to
1997:48 the new Family Preservation and Support Program
within Title IV-B.49 The program provided matching funds for
states to develop these family preservation programs as well as
broader and less-targeted "family support" services, including
43. See id. § 101, 42 U.S.C. §§ 673-74.
44. See id. § 674(a)(3).
45. See Toshio Tatara, The Recent Rise in the U.S. Child Substitute Care
Population: An Analysis of National Child Substitute Care Flow Data, in 1
CHILD WELFARE RES. REV. 126, 130 tbl.6.1 (Richard P. Barth et al. eds., 1994)
(showing that the foster care population increased from 273,000 at the begin-
ning of fiscal year 1986 to 429,000 at the end of fiscal year 1991).
46. See COURTNEY, supra note 21, at 8 (noting that in real terms, federal
foster care spending grew by more than 400% between 1981 and 1993, while
Title IV-B services spending grew by only 14% and funds available under the
Title XX Social Services Block Grant declined); see also GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, CHILD WELFARE: STATES' PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING
FAMILY PRESERVATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES 3 (1997) ("By the early 1990s,
over half the [child services] programs we surveyed reported that they were
not able to serve all families who needed services primarily due to the lack of
funds and staff.").
47. See COSTIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 119-22, 126-29; Paul Adams,
Marketing Social Change: The Case of Family Preservation, 16 CHILD. &
YOUTH SERVS. REV. 417, 423-37 (1994).
48. Minor modifications of the federal legislative structure include the
Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-432, §§ 201-10, 108 Stat.
4398, 4453-60 (1994), and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
101-508, § 5052, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388 (1990).
49. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 13711, 42 U.S.C. §§ 629-
29(e) (1994).
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health, education, and child care programs.5 0 The Family
Preservation and Support Program thus attempted to renew
the emphasis of the 1980 Congress on preventive services.
B. AIMS
Four years after the passage of the family preservation
and support legislation, Congress and the Clinton Administra-
tion again moved to alter federal child welfare law.51 They ex-
pressed three broad concerns. First, "reasonable efforts" had
become "unreasonable efforts."52 Congress was told that with-
out regulations clarifying the concept,53 states believed they
could not remove a child from her home without first offering
her family services, even if that delay endangered the child's
50. See id.
51. Both the Clinton Administration and the President were involved in
the development of ASFA. In late 1996, the President announced his goal of
doubling the number of adoptions from foster care by 2002 and assuring for
every child a "strong and stable home." President's Radio Address, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2512, 2512 (Dec. 14, 1996). At his direction, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a report recommend-
ing many of the measures later incorporated in ASFA. See U.S. DEPT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADOPTION 2002: A RESPONSE TO THE PRESI-
DENTIAL EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM ON ADOPTION ISSUED DECEMBER 14, 1996,
at 1 (1997) [hereinafter ADOPTION 2002].
For their parts, the House and Senate held several hearings on aspects of
the child welfare system between 1995 and 1997. See, e.g., Adoption and
Support of Abused Children: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 105th
Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Adoption and Support of Abused Children]; Child
Welfare Revision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. and Family Pol-
icy of the Senate Fin. Comm., 104th Cong. 43-44, 47-49, 68-74, 82-91 (1997)
[hereinafter Child Welfare Revision]; Barriers to Adoption: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th
Cong. 2-64 (1996) [hereinafter Barriers to Adoption]; Improving the Well-
Being of Abused and Neglected Children, supra note 10; Federal Adoption Pol-
icy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm.
on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 1-3 (1995) [hereinafter Federal Adoption Pol-
icy]; Streamlining Child Welfare Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 2-96 (1995).
52. 143 CONG. REC. S12,669 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
DeWine); see also id. at H10,788 (statement of Rep. Kennelly) (charging that
reasonable efforts had become "every effort, [effectively] putting a child at
risk").
53. See Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children, su-
pra note 10, at 10 (statement of the Child Welfare League of America) ("A
great deal of confusion and lack of clarity have occurred because the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services has never issued formal regulations
and guidance."); ADOPTION 2002, supra note 51, at 20 ("The Federal
'reasonable efforts' [requirement] has been ... criticized for being unclear and
a barrier to child safety and permanence.").
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life.54 Experts, activists, and journalists told horror stories of
state agencies that had sent children home to parents who had
savagely beaten,55 prostituted,56 or tried to ki1157 them or their
siblings. In publicized cases like that of Eliza Izquierdo in New
York City, parents murdered children whom state agencies had
known were subject to abuse.5 8 Some commentators treated
these cases as indicia of the larger failure of family preserva-
tion programs to achieve measurable results.59 The more
common view was that family preservation could still be useful
in some circumstances, but not when parents had crossed a
line that made them dangerous to their children.6 0
54. See Barriers to Adoption, supra note 51, at 32 (statement of Connie
Binsfield, Lieutenant Governor of Michigan) ("Children are entering foster
care more damaged because they are left in their abusive homes while work-
ers attempt to prove the unprovable to the federal government-that the un-
defined, nebulous 'reasonable efforts' have been made to prevent the removal
of the children from their home[s]."); Improving the Well-Being of Abused and
Neglected Children, supra note 10, at 11-12 (statement of Dr. Richard Gelles)
(describing professionals who believed they could not remove a child from an
abusive home "because we had to make reasonable efforts to reunify [him]
with his [abusive] mother"); see also Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Ef-
forts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV.
223,225(1990).
55. See Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children, su-
pra note 10, at 11 (statement of Dr. Richard Gelles) (describing the case of
"David," a slightly fictionalized boy whom the state left with a mother who
killed him after having broken his sister's skull, ribs, arms, and legs).
56. See Douglas J. Besharov, When Home Is Hell: We Are Too Reluctant to
Take Children From Bad Parents, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1996, at C1 (describing
a caseworker's efforts to return a child to a parent who "had repeatedly
beaten [her children] so badly that they had been hospitalized a number of
times for their injuries").
57. See Mary McGrory, Adopt a Sense of Outrage, WASH. POST, May 12,
1996, at C1 (describing the District of Columbia's efforts to reunite a girl with
the mother who had tried to smother her to death with a pillow).
58. See Rita Kramer, In Foster Care, Children Come Last, CITY J.,
Autumn 1994, at 63 (noting that in New York City in 1992, 21 children were
killed by a parent or mother's boyfriend after the child welfare agency.had in-
tervened). Two authorities stated that among children who died in circum-
stances suggestive of abuse, "about half... died after the family was reported
to a child protective agency." Besharov, supra note 56; see also Improving the
Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children, supra note 10, at 10 (statement
of Dr. Richard Gelles) (same statistic).
59. See, e.g., RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: HOW PRESERVING
FAmLmEs CAN COST CHILDREN'S LIVES 115-43 (1996) (chapter-length indict-
ment of family preservation). Gelles assisted Republican leaders in drafting
ASFA. See McGrory, supra note 57, at C1.
60. See, e.g., PATRICK T. MURPHY, WASTED: THE PLIGHT OF AMERICA'S
UNWANTED CHILDREN 73 (1997) ("The child welfare system has failed children
because it refuses to distinguish between parents who are ill-equipped to raise
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A second major concern was foster care drift. Caseloads
had risen further since 1993, reaching a record of 502,000 in
1996.61 The median stay in foster care had also grown from fif-
teen months in 1987 to more than two years in 1994.62 Chil-
dren in long-term foster care were still moving from one home
to another: in 1990, most foster children experienced multiple
placements,63 and according to a California study, "[forty-six
percent] of infants living in nonkinship care will have four or
more homes in six years."64 Foster care drift appeared to be as
much of a problem as it had been in 1980.
While learning about the special contributions of the crack
epidemic and concentrated urban poverty to rising foster care
caseloads, 65 Congress also blamed that increase on two other
their children adequately without help, and parents who are too immature or
thuggish to raise children even with help."); Improving the Well-Being of
Abused and Neglected Children, supra note 10, at 5 (prepared statement of
Olivia A. Golden, Acting Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, De-
partment of Health and Human Services) ("[Reunification] services are clearly
not appropriate when children cannot be safe in their own homes."); id. at 26
(statement of Peter Digre, Director of Los Angeles Department of Child and
Youth Services) (identifying circumstances in which "it is futile and unreason-
able to endanger children [by making] efforts to preserve or reunify their
families"); Besharov, supra note 56 (calling on the public to accept that "many
severely abused and neglected children need a permanent place to live away
from their parents").
61. See Dale Rusakoff, One Child's Chaotic Bounce in Mother Govern.
ment's Lap, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at Al. But see infra note 92
(discussing limitations of such data).
62. See Dale Rusakoff, 1997 Law Redefines Child-Protection Policies in
Place Since 1980, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at A23.
63. See 1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 20, at 751 (showing that the share
of foster children experiencing multiple placements had risen from 43% in
1982 to 57% in 1990).
64. See Richard P. Barth & Barbara Needell, Using Performance Indica-
tors with Child Welfare Policy Makers and Managers 7 (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review). For citation in Congress
of different but equally disturbing data, see Improving the Well-Being of
Abused and Neglected Children, supra note 10, at 54 (prepared statement of
Peter Digre) ("[Eighty-three percent] of toddlers (ages 1-2 years) entering non-
relative foster care had a change in foster parents within six years, and 62%
had three or more foster homes .... Almost one out of three had five or more
foster homes.").
65. See Impact of Substance Abuse on Families Receiving Welfare: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Ways & Means
Comm., 105th Cong. 1-3 (1997) [hereinafter Substance Abuse in Welfare Fami-
lies] (testimony of Richard P. Barth); Improving the Well-Being of Abused and
Neglected Children, supra note 10, at 44 (testimony of the Child Welfare
League of America); see also Mark F. Testa, Conditions for Risk for Substitute
Care, 14 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 27, 35 (1992) (identifying five "risk fac-
648 [Vol. 83:637
DRIFTING THROUGH BYZANTIUM
factors. First, notwithstanding the mandatory processes under
the Child Welfare Act, the child welfare system continued to
move at a "glacial pace."66 Second, the same reunification-at-
all-costs mentality reflected in the prevailing interpretation of
"reasonable efforts" was also contributing to drift. 67 States
were leaving children in foster care for years while attempting
to rehabilitate chronically abusive parents,68 or sending chil-
dren back into dangerous homes to be reabused and then
placed with different foster families. 69 Drift was thus partly a
policy failure.
Congress's third aim was to increase adoptions of foster
children unable to return to their parents. Much as family
preservation had united liberals and conservatives in the late
1970s, so adoption now enjoyed fervent bipartisan support.
With the President's help, Republicans had already pushed
through Congress an adoption tax credit and a tightening of
the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, banning delays in the adop-
tion process that result from race-based matching of parents
and children.70 President Clinton had also announced a na-
tional goal of doubling the number of children adopted from
foster care to 54,000 by the year 2002.71 Yet both sides agreed
they could do more. Although new data showed an increase in
tors" for caseload growth: single and teen parenting, child poverty, child
abuse, substance abuse, and AIDS).
66. See Adoption and Support of Abused Children, supra note 51
(testimony of Rep. Camp); see also ADOPTION 2002, supra note 51, at 5-6
(noting the harmful impact of delays throughout the child welfare system on
permanency planning).
67. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,673 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Craig) (criticizing "the culture of foster care" in the system for causing
foster care drift).
68. See ADOPTION 2002, supra note 51, at 5; GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: STATE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE PERMANENCY
PLANNING PROCESS SHOW SOME PROMISE 15 (1997).
69. See 143 CONG. REC. H10,788 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Kennelly); Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children,
supra note 10, at 53-54 (testimony of Peter Digre, Dir., Los Angeles Dep't of
Child and Youth Servs.); Promoting Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong.
(Apr. 6, 1997) [hereinafter Promoting Adoption] (testimony of MaryLee Allen,
Children's Defense Fund).
70. See Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 1807-
08, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
71. See President's Radio Address, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2512
(Dec. 14, 1996); ADOPTION 2002, supra note 51, at 2.
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the number of public sector adoptions, 72 such adoptions had not
kept pace with the dramatic growth in the foster care popula-
tion over the last decade 7 3 Congress hoped to reduce foster
care drift largely by increasing adoptions.
C. POLICIES
ASFA addresses the three major concerns of Congress and
the Administration with a series of interlocking measures.
First, to protect child safety, the Act clarifies the "reasonable
efforts" requirement in three notable ways. In making reason-
able efforts, the law states that "the child's health and safety
shall be the paramount concern."74 States are not required to
make reasonable efforts where a court determines that the
parent has committed specified violent crimes against any
child of hers.75 And reasonable efforts also are not required if a
court determines that the parent has subjected a particular
child to certain "aggravating circumstances" defined by state
law.76 Together, these provisions aim to prevent the dangerous
reunification efforts that Congress perceived were occurring.
Second, ASFA contains three sets of provisions specifically
designed to reduce foster care drift. 77 If a court determines
that "reasonable efforts" to reunify the family are not required,
the state must hold a "permanency hearing"-the rechristened
"dispositional hearing" under prior law-within 30 days and
make "reasonable efforts" to find another permanent place-
ment for the child78 The Act also speeds up and modifies per-
manency hearings. Permanency hearings must now be held
every twelve months; can no longer produce temporary foster
72. See Richard Willing, Foster Care Adoptions Up Sharply, USA TODAY,
Oct. 8, 1997, at IA.
73. In 1984, there were 276,000 children in foster care and 20,000 adop-
tions. See 1996 GREEN BoOK, supra note 20, at 754 tbl.12-28. In 1996, there
were 502,000 in foster care, see Rusakoff, supra note 61, at Al, and 27,000
adoptions, see ADOPTION 2002, supra note 51, at 1.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (1994).
75. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D). These crimes are murder, voluntary man-
slaughter, attempted murder or manslaughter, or felony assault resulting in
serious bodily harm. See id.
76. Id. While leaving definition of these circumstances to states, ASFA
provides "abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse" as exam-
ples. Id.
77. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 13 (1997), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2745-46; ADOPTION 2002, supra note 51, at 18.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E).
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care as a formal disposition; and can now only result in long-
term foster care based on a "compelling reason," not "special
needs or circumstances." 79 To reduce delays in placements fol-
lowing unexpected shifts in parental conduct, ASFA formally
endorses the practice of "concurrent planning," or efforts to find
an alternative placement while also attempting reunification
prior to the permanency hearing.80 As a result of these re-
forms, Congress expected that "final permanency decisions"
would be made at permanency hearings. 81
ASFA's third measure to reduce foster care drift is its most
striking. The Act mandates that after a child has spent fifteen
of twenty-two months in foster care, the state must file a ter-
mination of parental rights petition unless one of three excep-
tions applies: (1) the child is in the care of a relative; (2) there
is a "compelling reason" to maintain parental rights based on
the interests of the child; or (3) the state has failed to provide
mandatory "reasonable efforts."82 Members of Congress hoped
that this provision would create a "clear expectation ... that
the biological parents have a fixed period of time to improve."
83
Finally, ASFA promotes adoption in several ways. Each
state must document efforts to search for an adoptive parent
through adoption exchanges whenever the permanency plan is
not reunification. 84 When a mandatory termination of parental
rights is instituted after fifteen months in foster care, the state
must seek "to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified
family for an adoption."85 States can no longer allow interju-
risdictional barriers to delay adoptions.8 6 And in the one modi-
fication to funding flows under the new Act, ASFA creates an
incentive program designed to increase adoptions of foster
children. Under the program, states receive an additional
$4,000 per child for the increase in the number of foster chil-
dren adopted per year over the average number prior to the
79. Id. § 675(5)(C).
80. Id. § 671(a)(15)(F).
81. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 13.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). Besides the 15-month rule, ASFA also re-
quires termination, subject to the exceptions, if the child is an abandoned in-
fant or the parent has committed the same violent crimes that justify denial of
reasonable efforts. See id.; supra note 75.
83. Adoption and Support of Abused Children, supra note 51 (statement
of Rep. Camp).
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(E).
85. Id. § 675(5)(E).
86. See id. §§ 622(b), 674(e).
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passage of the Act, and an additional $6,000 per additional fos-
ter child with special needs.87 Congress authorized $100 mil-
lion over five years for the program, or enough for incentive
payments for between 16,500 and 25,000 children over five
years. 88
D. RATIONALE
Although the sponsors of ASFA claimed that these provi-
sions would benefit children, they did not state in any detail
the support for this proposition. It is not difficult, however, to
uncover the principled case for ASFA. The argument draws on
the immensely influential Best Interests of the Child trilogy by
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, Albert Solnit, and Sonja Gold-
stein.89 The Best Interests framework has been harshly criti-
cized for its lack of empirical support, among other things.90
This criticism is perhaps unfair in a field where all contribu-
tors must cope with a scarcity of careful outcome-oriented
studies,91 and a total absence of good aggregate data.92 As the
87. See id. §§ 673b(d)(1)(A)-(B).
88. See id.
89. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD(1986); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD(1979); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD(1973). Recently, the trilogy reappeared in one revised, updated volume. See
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19. For a discussion and critique of these
works' great influence, see generally Peggy C. Davis, 'There Is A Book
Out.. .. An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1539 (1987).
90. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search
of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1762 (1987).
91. See RICHARD P. BARTH ET AL., FROM CHILD ABUSE TO PERMANENCY
PLANNING: CHILD WELFARE SERVICES PATHWAYS AND PLACEMENTS 9-11, 13-
14 (1994). The most widely cited studies of child welfare come largely from
two sources: the Child Welfare Research Center at the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley and the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of
Chicago. See, e.g., BARTH ET AL., supra; ROBERT M. GOERGE ET AL., A REPORT
FROM THE MULTISTATE FOSTER CARE DATA ARCHIVE 1983-1992 (1994). Re-
searchers and advocates involved with both child welfare policy and welfare
policy caution that they know much less about the former than the latter. In-
terview with Jill Duerr Berrick, Director, Child Welfare Research Center,
School of Social Welfare, University of California at Berkeley (Apr. 27, 1998).
Based on these limitations and the conflicts among certain studies, some have
concluded that the data offer no meaningful guidance for policy. See James
Donald Moorehead, Of Family Values and Child Welfare: What Is in the "Best"
Interests of the Child?, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 517 (1996). But the researchers
themselves believe that cautious conclusions can be drawn with help from the
data. See, e.g., BARTH ET AL., supra, at 255-74; Fred H. Wulczyn & Robert M.
Goerge, Foster Care in New York and Illinois: The Challenge of Rapid
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following discussion attempts to show, these authors' work is
nonetheless compelling in view of what is now known. With
modifications, it represents the sensible foundation on which
ASFA attempts to build.
The "reasonable efforts" requirement, which ASFA modi-
fies but retains, serves children by minimizing the likelihood
that they will suffer harmful separation from their parents. At
a theoretical level, Goldstein and his co-authors forcefully ar-
gued that disrupting the parent-child relationship seriously
hurts children of all ages, causing psychological difficulties, an-
tisocial behavior, and low achievement. 93 These claims about
the harms of separation from parents gathered support from
other theoretical perspectives 94 and empirical work.95 Some
more recent studies have suggested that foster children fare
better over short periods than similarly situated children left
in their homes.96 But these studies have generally not consid-
ered the likelihood that once in foster care, a child will remain
Change, 66 Soc. SERV. REV. 278,291-93 (1992). In any event, as the need for
child welfare policy will remain whether or not the data are decisive, the poli-
cymaker finally must choose between taking some cues from the research and
relying on supposition and anecdote alone.
92. States now report aggregate data on child "abuse" and "neglect," but
comparative use of these data is limited by the fact that different states define
these terms very differently. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., NAT'L
CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1995: REPORTS
FROM THE STATES TO THE NAT'L CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM 2-1
(1997). In theory, aggregate-level data for foster care caseloads by state are
also now available, but many states do not contribute data, and those that do
again report very different things. See, e.g., Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Current Placement Setting of Children Entering Foster Care 1-3
(visited Apr. 2, 1998) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/stats/afcars/cpsed
96b.html> (showing latest data on foster care placements for children in only
22 states, and describing data anomalies in 11 of those states).
93. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 19-20.
94. See, e.g., JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS (1969) (describing
harms of separation from perspective of attachment theory); Robert M. Go-
erge, The Reunification Process in Substitute Care, 64 Soc. SERV. REV. 422,
424 (1990) (describing theoretical bases for opposing separation).
95. See, e.g., Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected"
Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring
the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623, 669-72 (1976) (and sources cited therein).
96. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND
NEGLECTED CHILDREN 185 (1988) (finding that children in foster care fared
slightly better than children left at home in controlled study over two-year
period); Garrison, supra note 90, at 1777-87 (discussing other studies and con-
cluding that foster care benefits many children).
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there for a long time and experience multiple placements, 97
which in turn cause grave harms.98 Moreover, there is consid-
erable evidence that children in foster care often face harsh
conditions while in care99 and dismal futures in their adult
lives.100 To the extent that a reasonable efforts policy mini-
mizes the likelihood that children will experience these harms,
it is justified for the sake of children. 101
Though the reasonable efforts requirement in the Child
Welfare Act served children's need for permanency, this need is
not paramount at all times, and ASFA recognizes this fact. It
is common sense that physical well-being is as much a prereq-
uisite to child development as psychological well-being. 02 In-
deed, Goldstein and his co-authors argued that the two are
deeply intertwined: an abusive parent assaults psychological
as well as physical health, ultimately destroying the child's
97. See Douglas J. Besharov, The Misuse of Foster Care: When the Desire
to Help Children Outruns the Ability to Improve Parental Functioning, in
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: POLICY AND PRACTICE
185, 192 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1988) ("Research shows positive results in
foster care because, for many children, foster care is an extremely beneficial
experience. But for a large subset (generally children who cannot be quickly
returned home or freed for adoption), foster care is very harmful."); see also
WALD ET AL., supra note 96, at 185-90 (1988) (finding that children in foster
care fared relatively well, but only over two-year period of stable placement).
For data on the likelihood of long-term placement, see supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
99. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional
Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 199, 208-12 (1988); Rachel L. Swarns, Judge Approves City's Foster Care
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1998, at B3 (describing how city "bed shortage"
left 2,000 foster children sleeping in municipal offices).
100. See, e.g., JENNIFER TOTH, ORPHANS OF THE LIVING: STORIES OF
AMERICA'S CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 17 (1997) (stating that up to 30 or 40%
of the shelter population in major American cities has passed through foster
care); Richard P. Barth & Marianne Berry, Implications of Research on the
Welfare of Children Under Permanency Planning, in 1 CHILD WELFARE RES.
REV. 323, 345-46 (Richard P. Barth et al. eds., 1994) (showing that among
children leaving foster care between 1980 and 1988, almost one-third had pe-
riods of homelessness or weekly movement among homes, and one-third used
drugs or had four alcoholic drinks each day); Fred Bayles & Sharon Cohen,
Chaos Often the Only Parent for Abused and Neglected Children, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1995, at 1 (stating that 75% of youths in Connecticut's criminal jus-
tice system were once in foster care).
101. In addition, reasonable efforts may also gather support from a variety
of perspectives besides the child's welfare, including family autonomy, paren-
tal rights, social diversity, and distrust of state power. See WALD ET AL., su-
pra note 96, at 190.
102 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.
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ability to feel safe, wanted, and loved. 103 Provisions that by-
pass reunification efforts where parents have subjected a child
to "aggravated circumstances" can protect that child's safety
without sacrificing valuable relationships. More generally,
provisions that bypass reunification where parents have com-
mitted terrible crimes against any children protect children's
physical safety from dangerous parents. 104
Stopping foster care drift is also critical for children. Gold-
stein and his co-authors argued that because children have a
"sense of time" much shorter than that of adults, they can suf-
fer grievously from brief periods of uncertainty and loss. 105 Re-
cent empirical work confirms their worry that long periods of
multiple placements or "drif" will be seriously harmful. Even
in a loving, long-term foster home,1 06 the uncertainty of the fos-
ter care status may cause hardship.107 More importantly, mul-
tiple placement is the norm in long-term placement, 108 and it
has been proven to have "a variety of negative consequences for
children and adolescents." 09 Perhaps worst of all, long-term
care is self-perpetuating: as a child ages, her chances of both
103. See id. at 112.
104. See Federal Adoption Policy, supra note 51, at 98 (testimony of Dr.
Albert J. Solnit) (rejecting efforts at family preservation "if the child is not
wanted, is abandoned, or is severely abused to the point where the child's life
is endangered or the child may be permanently injured"); Wald, supra note 95,
at 694-95 (advocating immediate termination if parents are "untreatable").
105. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 41-42.
106. See generally Barth & Needell, supra note 64, at 6 (noting that long-
term foster care is not per se destructive).
107. See JUDITH S. MODELL, KINSHIP WITH STRANGERS: ADOPTION AND
INTERPRETATIONS OF KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 46 (1994); see also Mi-
chael Bohman & Soren Sigvardsson, Outcome in Adoption: Lessons from Lon-
gitudinal Studies, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 93 (David M. Brodzinsky
& Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990) (finding that children in foster care have
greater psychological difficulties than children with adoptive or biological par-
ents, and recommending that "any unnecessary prolongation of the socially,
legally, and psychologically insecure limbo-situation of foster care should be
avoided"); John Triseliotis & Malcolm Hill, Contrasting Adoption, Foster Care,
and Residential Rearing, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 107, 113 ("Foster
children are left largely in limbo searching for ways to cement their attach-
ments to those who care for them.").
108. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
109. Robert Goerge et al., A Foster Care Research Agenda for the '90s, 73
CHILD WELFARE 525, 537 (1994); see also Barth & Needell, supra note 64, at 7
(describing the harm caused by multiple placement as "self-explanatory").
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reunification 10 and adoption' decline precipitously. The
longer children remain in foster care, therefore, the more likely
they are to reach adulthood there, and children who do so face
grim prospects.112 The provisions in ASFA that seek to reduce
drift reflect the growing harms that result from lengthy stays
in foster care.
Finally, much evidence also suggests that children who
cannot be promptly reunified with their parents would benefit
from the adoptions that Congress seeks to encourage. Gold-
stein and his co-authors argued that children benefit when
their upbringing is guided by loving adults rather than the
state.113 Parental autonomy provides a foundation for chil-
dren's trust and love, and parents are more likely than the
state to make good decisions. 14 Recent empirical data power-
fully confirm that adoption is generally a very positive experi-
ence for children. 115 There is thus good reason to believe that
ASFA's adoption promotion policy, like the other aspects of the
Act, could help abused and neglected children.
110. See Mark E. Courtney, Factors Associated with the Reunification of
Foster Children with Their Families, 68 SOC. SERV. REV. 81, 91 (1994); Go-
erge, supra note 94, at 439-40.
11L See Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the Odds of Adoption
Versus Remaining in Long-Term Out-of-Home Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 285,
296 (1997); Ada Schmidt-Tieszen & Thomas P. McDonald, Children Who Wait:
Long Term Foster Care or Adoption, 20 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 13, 20
(1998).
112. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE OVERVIEW,
COMPLEX NEEDS STRAIN CAPACITY TO PROVIDE SERVICES 14-15 (1995).
A study conducted 2.5 to 4 years after youths left foster care found
that 46% had not completed high school, 38% had not held a job for
more than 1 year, 25% had been homeless for at least one night, and
60% of young women had given birth to a child. [Forty percent] had
been on public assistance, incarcerated, or a cost to the community in
some other way.
Id.; see also Barriers to Adoption, supra note 51, at 79 (statement of Peter Di-
gre) (citing studies showing that 45% of 18-year-olds "emancipated" from fos-
ter care are homeless at some point in the next year).
113. See GOLDSTEINETAL., supra note 19, at 90-91.
114. See id.
115. See Federal Adoption Policy, supra note 51, at 103 (statement of Dr.
Nicholas Zill) (describing research comparing the well-being of children in
adoptive homes, two-parent homes, single-parent, and grandparent-homes,
and stating that the impact of adoption on children is "overwhelmingly a posi-
tive one"); Richard P. Barth, Adoption Research: Building Blocks for the Next
Decade, 73 CHILD WELFARE 625, 630 (1994) (noting the "remarkable... de-
gree of consistency in favorable outcome in widely differing types of adoption")(citation omitted); Barth & Berry, supra note 100, at 342-45 (summarizing
studies showing benefits of adoption for children).
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II. HOW ASFA HAS FAILED CHILDREN IN PRINCIPLE
Even when it is possible to prioritize children in a general
way, putting them first in specific situations is often "difficult
and painful."116 It is difficult because adults do not have chil-
dren's needs and cannot easily see what they are. It is painful
because what is good for children may be unfair to adults.
Although ASFA's general principles make sense for chil-
dren, its specific provisions fail to protect children's interests.
In some instances, Congress appears to have been unable to
see important distinctions among children. In other cases,
Congress may have seen children's interests but preferred,
notwithstanding its rhetoric, to favor certain parental needs or
cultural ideologies. Whatever the causes of these failures,
their effect on children is negative.
This part examines the two distinct failures of ASFA to
put children first: the self-contradictory reforms of the
"reasonable efforts" requirement and the disregard of age-
based differences. Because of these failures, ASFA is not the
blueprint it might have been for achieving two of Congress's
three major goals: reducing foster care drift and increasing
adoptions. The mistreatment of "reasonable efforts" would
needlessly leave children in foster care and limit the number of
adoptions. The age-insensitivity would heighten these effects
among young children, and make the "drift" of older children in
foster care only more painful.
A. CONFUSION OVER"REASONABLE EFFORTS"
Previous discussion suggests a plausible "children-first"
explanation of the reasonable efforts and mandatory termina-
tion provisions in current federal law. When a child is first
placed into care, her strongest bonds are to her parents, and so
the state should generally make "reasonable efforts" to reunify
the family.'1 7 After a time in foster care, however, the balance
of harms shifts, with reunification becoming less likely or bene-
ficial and permanent placement more urgent.11 8 The state
should therefore generally stop "reasonable efforts" and, since
adoption is the preferred permanent placement after reunifica-
tion, seek to find an adoptive home for the child. 119 The man-
116. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 81.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (1994).
118. See supra notes 93-101, 105-12.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
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datory termination provision balances the child's interest in
reunification in the short-term with her need for permanency
over the long-term.
Yet it is also easy to describe the reasonable efforts re-
quirement in terms that reflect an adult-oriented sense of jus-
tice. For example, parents can now claim preventive or reuni-
fication services only if they have not committed a crime or
subjected their children to "aggravating" circumstances120-a
term familiar from criminal law.'21 Whatever else it does, this
provision punishes parents who commit especially grievous
wrongs by cutting off assistance and threatening their families'
integrity. In this case, however, the provision also likely serves
children by protecting them from dangerous adults. 22 The
adult and child interests appear to coincide.
At three other points, however, ASFA favors the interests
of adults in ways that clearly harm children. Two of these
problems derive from exceptions to the mandatory termination
requirements. The first exception applies when "at the option
of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative."123 This
provision exempts from the mandatory termination and adop-
tion provision the large and growing number of children in the
care of relatives: so-called "kinship care."'24 This policy has
some child-oriented justification: children in "kinship care" can
fare better than children in foster care along numerous axes.
Although kinship placements often provide fewer resources
than nonkin placements and occasionally endanger children,125
in general they offer children less trauma at separation,126
more regular parental visitation,127 and most importantly, less
likelihood of harmful multiple placements.128 Given the vast
120. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D).
121. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (1994) (aggravating factors in federal
death penalty law); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (requiring a
court to find at least one "aggravating factor" in order to sentence a defendant
to death).
122. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 675(E)(i).
124. See MICHAEL R. PETIT & PATRICK A. CURTIS, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: A LOOK AT THE STATES 77 (1997) (stating that 23% of children in
out-of-home care are now in kinship care, up 29% from 1990).
125. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 91, at 214.
126. See Charlene Ingram, Kinship Care: From Last Resort to First Choice,
75 CHILD WELFARE 550, 552 (1996).
127. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 91, at 216; Howard Dubowitz et al., A
Profile of Kinship Care, 72 CHILD WELFARE 153, 154 (1993).
128. See BARTH ETAL., supra note 91, at 209.
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gap between the number of children in foster care and the
number adopted each year, not moving all children in kinship
care toward adoption makes good sense for mistreated children
generally.
But children do not benefit from failure to pursue adoption
when a kinship caregiver wishes to adopt. Kin generally resist
adopting because they see themselves as family and do not
wish to upset biological parents. 129 Some relative caregivers do
adopt, however, and many more might if they were not often
discouraged by caseworkers. 130 When a kinship caregiver does
wish to adopt, there is no danger of needlessly depleting the
supply of adoptive parents; the caregiver who is "already fam-
ily" has a unique bond to the child. And the fact that the rela-
tive caregiver-the daily caregiver-wishes to adopt provides
powerful prima facie evidence that reunification is not likely or
would not be beneficial.131 To be sure, some kinship caregivers
might inappropriately wish to adopt children who remain
tightly bonded to their parents.132 In those circumstances,
however, kinship adoption is not in the child's best interests,
and a separate exception to the reasonable efforts requirement
would apply.133 The rationale for the exception in current law
is preserving the biological family-both the biological parent-
child bond and the broader biological bonds of the kinship
unit.1 34 These goals may be important, but they are not the
same as the child's interest in permanent placement.
129. See iaL at 213; Jesse L. Thornton, Permanency Planning for Children
in Kinship Foster Homes, 70 CHILD WELFARE 593, 597 (1991).
130. See James P. Gleeson et al., Understanding the Complexity of Practice
in Kinship Foster Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 801, 812 (1997); Interview with
Jill Duerr Berrick, supra note 91.
131. Cf. Thornton, supra note 129, at 597-98 (showing that kinship care-
givers may decline to adopt because they believe that adoption would harm
their children).
132. Cf Dubowitz et al., supra note 127, at 165-66 (discussing "tensions
and hostilities that placement of a child might generate").
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii) (allowing states not to pursue termina-
tions that are not in the child's best interests).
134. See, e.g., NATIONAL AsSN OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, PRESERVING
AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RESEARCH AND ACTION BEYOND THE RHETORIC
(1991) (supporting kinship placements as a means to preserve African-
American cultural heritage); Dubowitz et al., supra note 127, at 154
(discussing the view that "blood is thicker than water"). Some defenses of
kinship care draw on the notions of cultural self-determination that also sup-
port a preference for race-matching in adoption. See Elizabeth Bartholet,
Where Do Black Children Belong?: The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1179-81 (1991). Congress has decisively rejected
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A second problematic exception declares that the state
need not seek to terminate parental rights after fifteen months
if it has failed to make required reasonable efforts. 135 Like the
kinship rule, this exception might be read only to mean that
states need not seek to terminate parental rights absent rea-
sonable efforts. But the congressional report expresses a
broader view, stating that "the termination of parental rights
is such a serious intervention that it should not be undertaken
without some effort to offer services to the family."136 Because
this perspective is widely shared in the states, this statement
is likely to reflect the prevailing interpretation of ASFA.137 In
that case, the federal provision effectively endorses many
states' readings of the reasonable efforts requirement to pre-
clude decrees of termination absent reasonable efforts as a
matter of law.138
Once again, the rule fair to adults is harmful to children.
The fairness to parents is evident: the state cannot destroy le-
gal bonds to children without first offering services. But the
exception also discourages terminations at a time when they
are often the best option for children. Indeed, the provision of-
ten operates to prevent adoption when a child has a high prob-
ability of adoption that is likely to diminish quickly139 -and
even when the child is already being cared for by a potential
adoptive parent. The child who loses such an adoption gains
very little. Children generally have a low probability of re-
these ideas through the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§
671(a)(18), 1996(b).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 475(5)(E)(iii).
136. H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 12 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2740,2744.
137. As a textual matter, the proper interpretation of the provision de-
pends upon the meaning of the requirement that "the State shall" file a ter-
mination petition "unless" the State has not made reasonable efforts. 42
U.S.C. § 675(E). The law does not say what happens if the "unless" condition
holds and the State has not made reasonable efforts; there is no "in which
case" provision. The narrowest reading is that the mandatory termination
provision simply does not apply. But this would mean that a state could, on
its own, negate the federal provision by enacting a statute categorically re-
quiring termination even in the absence of reasonable efforts. This would defy
the congressional statement of intent.
138. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 1998); CAL. Civ. CODE §
232 (repealed 1992) (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.464 (West 1998); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(8) (McKinney 1998).
139. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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turning home after fifteen months in foster care. 140 Reunifica-
tion becomes even less likely when the state has failed to pro-
vide adequate assistance: without social services, the parental
home is likely to have become only less suitable; 141 without as-
sisted visitation, the parent-child bond is likely to have attenu-
ated further. 42 Services much beyond the fifteen-month period
are not likely to increase the odds of reunification. 43 This pro-
vision therefore precludes permanent placement of children
who are not likely to return home or to benefit if they do.
Not just a theoretical concern, this exception threatens to
prolong the uncertain status of many children. According to a
report by the Inspector General of the Department of Health
and Human Services, state failures to make reasonable efforts
that satisfy state termination of parental rights statutes are
already "the primary barrier to implementing permanent plans
of adoption."'" This exception only reinforces that barrier. As
the exception is applied, children who cannot return home will
languish in foster care.145
It is no defense of the rule to point out that the failure to
provide services may indicate that the state is ignorant of the
child's best interests.' 46 A court should always consider
140. See Courtney, supra note 110, at 90-98 (showing that the likelihood of
reunification after one to three years in foster care is less than 15%); id. at 91-
92 & 108 n.20 (documenting other studies with similar findings); Goerge, su-
pra note 94, at 452 (noting that the probability of reunification drops below
50% after about 10 weeks in foster care).
14L See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
social services in fostering reunification).
142. See RUTH HUBBELL, FOSTER CARE AND FAMILIES: CONFLICTING
VALUES AND POLICIES 104-06 (1981); Inger P. Davis et al., Parental Visiting
and Foster Care Reunification, 18 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REv. 363, 363
(1996).
143. See Goerge, supra note 94, at 452.
144. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERvS., BARRIERS TO FREEING CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION 11 (1991); cf. Jennifer
Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical Evaluation of
the Length-Of-Time-Out-Of-Custody Ground for Termination of Parental
Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1280-81 (1996).
145. See MURPHY, supra note 60, at 76-77 (describing how states "often fail
to provide what courts interpret as 'adequate services' for the parent" and how
as a result "kids stay in the system, floating amongst foster homes, ultimately
becoming unadoptable"); Herring, supra note 30, at 181-94 (citing examples of
drift due to reasonable efforts requirement). Herring's article reaches conclu-
sions parallel to those here.
146. See Talk of the Nation: Adoption for Abused and Neglected Children
(NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 18, 1997) (available at 1997 WL 15382360)
(comment of David Liederman, Exec. Dir., Child Welfare League of America)
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whether termination is in the child's best interests. For exam-
ple, if a child remains deeply attached to her parents, or if her
parents are within a few weeks of assistance from reunifica-
tion, rigid adherence to a timetable would be foolish. But
ASFA already permits states to make those forward-lookingjudgments about the child's welfare under the exception based
on the child's best interests147 ASFA's backward-looking addi-
tion to that provision only discourages termination proceedings
that would serve the child's interests.
In another social context and statutory scheme, this provi-
sion would be defensible as an incentive for states that wish to
terminate parental rights to make reasonable efforts first. To-
day, however, the exception cannot so function, for two reasons.
First, it is not at all clear that most social workers or attorneys
are overwilling to terminate parental rights.148 If officials gen-
erally prefer reunification, the provision will operate not as an
incentive to make reasonable efforts, but as an opportunity to
avoid termination.149
More fundamentally, even when they want to provide the
reasonable efforts required by law, states frequently lack the
resources to do so. Child welfare services of every kind are now
not available to many families who need them.15 0 Data consis-
tently show that most families do not receive intensive family
preservation services designed to stop child placement51 even
(describing reasonable efforts provision as saying "don't come to us with a
TPR petition unless you've really figured out what the heck is really going on,
and you're ready and prepared to introduce a termination of parental rights
petition").
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii).
148. This argument is fully developed infra Part III.B.1.
149. In fact, because ASFA does not define "reasonable efforts," officials
can retrospectively identify the services that should have been provided, and
thereby avoid pursuing termination. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(iii) (stating
that termination need not be pursued when parents have not received "such
services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the
child's home").
150. See SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, No PLACE
TO CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. Doc No. 101-395, at
45-48 (1990) [hereinafter No PLACE TO CALL HOME]; GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 46, at 5; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note
144, at 11.
151. See, e.g., Barth & Berry, supra note 100, at 325 ("[F]amily preserva-
tion services are still not available for the vast majority of families in need.");
Courtney, supra note 110, at 88 (noting that in sample of children entering
foster care between 1988 and 1991, 70% received only "emergency response"
services, 20% received no services, and only 10% received extensive services);
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after the 1993 expansion of federal fumding for such pro-
grams.152 Although one-fifth to one-third of all children reuni-
fied with their parents return to foster care,153 most families do
not receive the reunification services that could prevent some
of those recurrent failures.1 54 Drug abuse is a major contribu-
tor to the foster care crisis,155 but drug treatment programs for
women with children and small infants are scarce. 56 Finally,
Fein & Maluccio, supra note 30, at 339 (noting that funding to implement
permanency planning "has been insufficient," and stating that as a result
"solutions remain short-term, crisis-oriented, and stopgap and lack ongoing
support for families").
152. See PETIT & CURTIS, supra note 124, at 184 (noting that the 25,000
families in 21 states receiving intensive preservation efforts were "but a frac-
tion of the families needing [them]"); see also COURTNEY, supra note 21, at 16
(describing impact of additional funding as a "drop in the bucket"); Goerge et
al., supra note 109, at 533 ("The pool of money is not particularly large rela-
tive to the magnitude of the problems. .. ."); Telephone Interview with An-
thony N. Maluccio, Professor, Boston College School of Social Work (Apr. 27,
1998).
153. See, e.g., Barth & Berry, supra note 100, at 336 (reporting various
studies showing that between 20% and 32% of children returned to foster care
after reunification); Mark E. Courtney, Reentry to Foster Care of Children Re-
turned to Their Families, 70 Soc. SERV. REV. 226, 233 (1995) (finding that
19% of reunified children returned to care within three years).
154. See, e.g., Mark W. Fraser et al., An Experiment in Family Reunifica-
tion: Correlates of Outcomes At One-Year Follow-Up, 18 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 335, 336 (1996) (noting that "few agencies have clearly articu-
lated reunification services for children in out-of-home care"); Fein & Maluc-
cio, supra note 30, at 339 ("The lack of family maintenance programs is an un-
fortunate correlate of the increasing number of children reentering foster care
each year."); see also Promoting Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Dr. Fred C. Wulczyn, Chapin Hall Center for Children)
("[Miost child welfare providers will acknowledge that the services used to
support families prior to and just after reunification are probably the weakest
link in the continuum of child welfare services.") [hereinafter Promoting
Adoption]; Tatara, supra note 45, at 140 (arguing that emphasis on family
preservation in the 1980s led to underdevelopment of family reunification
programs). Unlike family preservation, reunification efforts received no addi-
tional federal funding from the 1993 budget agreement. See supra notes 49-50.
155. See Stephen Magura & Alexandre B. Laudet, Parental Substance
Abuse and Child Maltreatment: Review and Implications for Intervention, 18
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 193, 194 (1996) ("Illicit drug abuse, particularly
the introduction of crack cocaine in urban areas since 1985, has contributed to
increases in both the incidence and severity of child abuse and neglect.").
156. See Substance Abuse in Welfare Families, supra note 65, at 23
(testimony of Richard P. Barth) (describing underdevelopment and scarcity of
drug treatment programs for women); Magura & Laudet, supra note 155, at
202 (citing numerous sources describing the "shortage of drug treatment pro-
grams for pregnant women and women with infants" as a "serious national
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long-term, low-intensity services, which could prevent children
who have been sent home from returning to foster care, have
sharply diminished in numbers since the 1970s. 157 The rea-
sonable efforts requirement cannot make states offer services
they do not have. The immense mismatch between the scope of
the reasonable efforts provision and the capacities of state bu-
reaucracies has been heightened by legal interpretation of the
reasonable efforts requirement. In the absence of federal
regulations defining reasonable efforts,158 many states have es-
tablished a broad definition, seeking "evidence that they have
exhausted all conceivable possibilities for keeping families to-
gether."159 As a result of this combination of high standards
and limited resources, the reasonable efforts requirement often
cannot spur proper state conduct. If anything, in fact, it may
discourage social workers who cannot possibly meet the legal
standard for termination from even attempting to find an
adoptive placement. 60
In addition to the two needless exceptions to the termina-
tion requirement, the third error in ASFA's treatment of serv-
ices is its failure to address this shortage of preventive serv-
ices. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, which ASFA retains,
does not reimburse services designed to prevent foster place-
ment.161 In spite of the efforts of the 1980 and 1993 Con-
gresses, the capped program that does support services, Title
IV-B, provides about one-seventh of the funding available un-
der Title IV-E.162 A substantial share of this limited funding
problem"). Most drug treatment programs were developed for men and now
serve them. See id. at 205.
157. See Douglas J. Besharov, Looking Beyond 30, 60, and 90 Days, 16
CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 445, 448 (1994) (noting that programs for
"long-term family supervision" have "shrunk considerably" and "homemaker
services... [have] all but withered away"); see also Barth & Berry, supra note
100, at 354 ("Available data suggests that preplacement services are often in-
appropriately brief....").
158. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
159. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 144, at 12; see also
MURPHY, supra note 60, at 76-77 (noting arbitrariness of court definitions of
"reasonable efforts").
160. See Herring, supra note 30, at 180.
161. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c) (1997) (listing reimbursable expenditures
under Title IV-E and including matters such as "case reviews" and "case man-
agement," but not preventive services); Foster Care Maintenance Assistance,
47 Fed. Reg. 30,922, 30,923 (1982) ("[Flunds for treatment-oriented services
[are] inconsistent with the statutory concept of maintenance expenditures").
162. See 1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 20, at 695 tbl.12-2.
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assists family support programs that do not primarily serve
children at risk of foster care placement. 163
Net federal funding for services is only likely to decline in
coming years. Although ASFA reauthorizes family preserva-
tion and support services at nominally higher levels, 164 the ex-
pansion in the uses of those funds to include adoption services
will further disperse resources and limit core preventive serv-
ices. 165 With the much greater 1996 reduction of fifteen percent
in the Social Services Block Grant, the total federal funding
available for reasonable efforts will decline.1
66
Congress considered and rejected proposals to expand both
reunification and drug treatment services in 1997,167 appar-
ently perceiving that these services do not work.168 But this
position was misguided on two accounts. First, as an analytic
matter, if the services are ineffective, then it is right not to
fund them, but wrong to require them in the first place-and
even more wrong to leave children in foster care because of
their absence. Having affirmed the importance of reunification
services as a prerequisite to termination of parental rights,
169
Congress should have provided for these services to avoid
stranding children in foster care. Second, although experts
163. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 112, at 5-7
(stating that "family support" programs have received most funding under the
1993 Act).
164, See 42 U.S.C. § 629(b) (1994) (authorizing a 20% increase in funding
from 1998 to 2001).
165. See id. § 629(a). Adoption groups are exhorting their members to seek
set-asides of this money for post-adoption services from state governments.
See Joe Kroll, Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 Signed into Law,
ADOPTALK (Minneapolis), Winter 1998, at 4.
166. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
reduced SSBG funding by 15%, or $420 million per year. See Peter T. Kilborn,
Little-Noticed Cut Imperils Safety Net for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1996, at Al. By comparison, ASFA increases the authorization for family
support and preservation by $10 million to $20 million per year. See ASFA §§
305, 430(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 629(b)).
167. See Safe Adoptions and Family Environments Act of 1997, S. 511,
105th Cong. § 202 (1997) (giving priority in drug treatment in federally
funded programs to persons referred by child protection agencies); see id. §
304 (reimbursing under Title IV-E program one year of reunification services).
168. See Adoption and Support of Abused Children, supra note 51
(statement of Rep. Camp).
169. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2739, 2740 ("The bipartisan group that wrote this legislation recognized the
importance and essential fairness of the reasonable efforts criterion.").
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caution that the data are not conclusive, 170 a variety of services
programs have produced lower levels of maltreatment and
higher rates of reunification. The evidence is least promising
for family preservation services, which have to date failed to
reduce out-of-home placement rates,171 though they have im-
proved some indicia of child welfare and merit further test-
ing.172 Even analysts critical of family preservation have rec-
ognized that targeted reunification efforts have greater
promise, 173 and recent studies confirm their effectiveness. 174
Though relatively new, drug treatment programs geared to
women with children have also proven effective, 175 as have tra-
ditional long-term services programs.1 76 The failure to fund
family services is thus inconsistent with both the theory un-
derlying ASFA and with the known facts about most of those
services.
ASFA's treatment of reasonable efforts punishes children
twice. Early on, when services could still prevent or shorten
placements in ways that benefit children, the Act does not as-
sure those services. Later, when services are not likely to lead
to safe reunification, ASFA discourages the state from finding
a permanent home for children. Stated otherwise, too many
terminations of parental rights are likely to become necessary
170. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
171. See Julia H. Littell & John R. Schuerman, A Synthesis of Research on
Family Preservation and Family Reunification Programs (visited Dec. 1, 1998)
<http'//aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/yp/fplitrev.htm>.
172. See Kristine E. Nelson, Family Preservation-What Is It?, 19 CHILD.
& YOUTH SERVS. REv. 101, 107-11 (1997).
173. See Littell & Schuerman, supra note 171, at 15.
174 See Fraser et al., supra note 154, at 345-50 (showing that in experi-
mental study, 97% of children receiving reunification services returned home
within 90 days, compared to only 32% of children in control group; at the end
of one year, 70% of children receiving reunification services were living at
home, compared to only 47% of the control group); Brian Thomlison et al.,
Protecting Children by Preserving Their Families: A Selective Research Per-
spective on Family Reunification, 2 INTL J. CHILD & FAM. WELFARE 127, 129-
30 (1996) (finding that intensive and brief family services positively affect re-
unification rates).
175. See Magura & Laudet, supra note 155, at 210 (showing, in programs
combining drug treatment and services for substance-abusing mothers, that
cases were successfully closed or risks of foster care placement reduced for
55% of children, and that 93% of children judged at "imminent risk" of foster
care placement remained at home); Substance Abuse in Welfare Families, su-
pra note 65, at 24 (testimony of Richard P. Barth) (describing early successes
of various programs).
176. See Besharov, supra note 157, at 445-50.
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because of the funding shortfall, yet too few terminations are
likely to occur as a result of the exception to the mandatory
termination provision. Children will lose too many parents,
and they will be found too few.
B. LACK OF AGE SENSITIVITY
These dangers are deepened by ASFA's timelines, which
do not distinguish among children based on age. Every child
receives an administrative case hearing after six months, a
permanency hearing after one year, and a presumptive termi-
nation of parental rights after fifteen months. Like the rea-
sonable efforts provisions, this uniform treatment of all chil-
dren secures a due process value for parents. If fairness
requires that parents receive help regaining custody of their
child as long as they are not too blameworthy for the child's
maltreatment, 177 then the age of the child is irrelevant. It is
surely as bad to neglect or abuse a one year-old as an eight
year-old or a fourteen year-old.1 78 As a matter of fairness to
parents, disregarding age treats like persons alike.
With respect to children's needs, however, ASFA treats dif-
ferent children identically. Consider again the provision for
termination of parental rights after fifteen months of foster
care. For the youngest children, especially infants, that wait
will often be too long. Infants are already a growing segment
of the foster care population that spends surprisingly long pe-
riods in foster care. 179 With the most telescoped "sense of
time," infants are least likely to have strong bonds to their
biological parents, 80 and they are most likely to suffer from
even brief periods in temporary care. 81 Infants also have the
greatest opportunities for adoption, but these opportunities
diminish quickly with age: according to an exhaustive Califor-
nia study, thirty-two percent of children who came into foster
care before their first birthday were adopted within six years of
placement into nonkinship care, compared to only twelve per-
177. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing
"aggravating factors").
178. Of course, the content of abuse may vary by age, but its blameworthi-
ness does not.
179. See BARTH ETAL., supra note 91, at 131.
180. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 41, 105-06 (theory); Wald,
supra note 95, at 695 (empirical support).




cent of children entering care between the ages of one and
two.18 2 Although state agency practices contribute to this gap,
one of its central causes is a dearth of parents available to
adopt older children.8 3 Children will become older in foster
care because of the delays in the statute: an infant will be
nearly one-and-a-half years old before ASFA requires the state
even to begin the process of terminating parental rights, and a
fourteen month-old toddler may be nearly three. 8 4 These de-
lays will cost young children adoption opportunities. 8 5
If ASFA moves too slowly with regard to young children, it
threatens to move too often for older ones. Significant numbers
of these children are strongly attached to biological parents,
and do not want to be adopted. 8 6 When they do move toward
adoption, they tend to experience disruption-removal from
the prospective adoptive home prior to finalization-at signifi-
cantly higher rates than other children. 8 7 Moreover, older
children are not adopted with anywhere near the frequency of
younger children: children over age ten constituted forty per-
cent of the children in out-of-home care in the United States in
1995, but less than twenty percent of the children adopted that
year. 88 If parental rights are terminated for large numbers of
older children, they risk joining the large and growing ranks of
182 See Barth, supra note 111, at 290 fig.l.
183. See id. at 297; Bartholet, supra note 134, at 1203.
184. The fifteen-month delay will often be seventeen months in practice.
See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
185. Cf Charlotte B. McCullough, The Child Welfare Response, 1 FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 61, 69 (1991) (noting as "barrier to adoption" the fact that dur-
ing the lengthy period in which termination occurs, "[tihe infants become tod-
dlers or older and the prospective parents become frustrated").
186. See Malcolm Bush & A.C. Gordon, The Case for Involving Children in
Child Welfare Decisions, 27 SOC. WORK 309, 309-10 (1982) (finding that half of
111 foster children over age nine judged unlikely to return home did not want
to be adopted because it would signal an end to ties with family of origin); see
also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 106 ("Some older children may hold
on to emotional attachments to absent parents fiercely and possessively; their
early, long-standing psychological ties may interfere with the formation of
new psychological attachments . .).
187. See Susan Livingston Smith & Jeanne A. Howard, A Comparative
Study of Successful and Disrupted Adoptions, 65 SOC. SERV. REV. 248, 250,
255 (1991).
188. See PETIT & CURTIS, supra note 124, at 135 fig.4.6. In the California
study, among children placed in non-kinship care between the ages of three




"legal orphans."189 That is a real loss; children often benefit
from ongoing contact with biological parents, however mea-
ger. 90 Moving swiftly to terminate parental rights is thus
much less advisable for older children than younger ones.
State laws governing termination of parental rights can
mitigate some of these problems, but ASFA's age-insensitivity
still threatens to misallocate scarce resources. In particular,
the widespread state practice of conditioning final termination
of parental rights on a finding that the child is "adoptable" will
limit the danger of pointless terminations for older children. 191
But that legal determination occurs only at the end of the ter-
mination process, a procedure that is far longer and more ar-
duous than typical hearings in the child welfare system.192
With so many state courts already so overburdened that they
cannot carefully handle their existing dockets,193 the addition
of compulsory terminations for older children is likely to limit
courts' time for the most urgent cases involving the youngest
children.
Many of these problems with the uniform termination re-
quirement also mar the twelve-month timeline for permanency
hearings. For example, states often delay returning children
home until after permanency hearings. 194 Although older chil-
189. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate
the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical
Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 132 (1995); Elizabeth Bartholet, In
Foster-Care Limbo, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1992, at 17.
190. See Barth & Berry, supra note 100, at 348; Guggenheim, supra note
189, at 135.
19L See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 144, at 16; Barth,
supra note 115, at 632. States determine adoptability based on a variety of
factors, including age, special-needs matters, and presence of a potential
adoptive parent in a child's life. Because older children are more often labeled
"not adoptable," the parental rights of their parents often may not be termi-
nated in spite of the timeline.
192. Compare Promoting Adoption, supra note 69 (statement of Mark
Hardin, American Bar Association) (stating that "emergency removal hear-
ings, foster care review hearings, and other pertinent court reviews [often]
last no longer than 5 or 10 minutes"), and John Gibeaut, Nobody's Child,
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 2 (visited Feb. 19, 1998) <http:llwww.abanet.org/jour-
nalIdec97/12FCHILD.HTML> (noting the "cattle call" nature of such hearings,
many of which last just five minutes), with OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, supra note 144, at 8 (stating that the median period for termination
of parental rights is seven-and-a-half months), and Herring, supra note 30, at
180 (describing the difficulty of obtaining termination of parental rights).
193. See Promoting Adoption, supra note 69 (statements of Kathi T. Grasso
and Mark Hardin, American Bar Association); Gibeaut, supra note 192, at 2.
194. See Courtney, supra note 110, at 90 fig.1.
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dren can perhaps more comfortably wait a full year for their
permanency hearing, younger children will more often suffer
through the delay. And the requirement that all children pro-
ceed through state processes at the same speed threatens to
delay the most pressing permanency hearings and diminish
them all in quality. Uniformity of treatment thus disserves
children again.
If the uniformity rule seems to reflect more concern for jus-
tice toward parents than permanency for children, a striking
detail of the uniform timeline reinforces that appearance.
ASFA does not begin to run its timetables until the earlier of
"the date of the first judicial finding that the child has been
subjected to child abuse or neglect; or the date that is 60 days
after the date on which the child is removed from the home."195
Because a finding of abuse or neglect need not accompany re-
moval and in some states seldom occurs within that two-month
window,196 this section effectively pushes out the timetable in
many cases by two months. Fifteen months is then really sev-
enteen months. Waiting for a judicial determination serves the
parent's interests in fairness, since her legal rights often have
not been prejudiced until a finding of abuse or neglect. 97 But
the critical fact for the child is the foster care, not the hearing
schedule. This provision assures more uniform process for
parents at the expense of more arbitrary treatment of chil-
dren's psychological needs.
Congress may have considered and rejected proposals to
recognize age differences for two inadequate reasons.1 98 First,
members may have felt that the relevant line is simply too dif-
ficult to draw. But this is an argument against the exercise of
prudence anywhere in the law. It discounts the greater costs of
195. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(F).
196. See, e.g., Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Conn. 1998)
(denying a motion to dismiss in a class action suit alleging that Connecticut
regularly fails to hold an evidentiary hearing on an order of temporary cus-
tody within the legally mandated ten-day period).
197. Prior to a finding of neglect, a judge's only decision is often ex parte
and temporary. See id. at 1095.
198. The original version of the bill passed by the House did distinguish
older and younger children, applying the mandatory termination provision
only to children under age 10. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 12 (1997), re-
printed in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2744; see also Adoption Promotion Act of
1997, S. 827, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997) (same provision). Other versions of the
proposed legislation set a deadline of 12 months, rather than 15. See Promo-
tion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected Children
(PASS) Act, S. 1195, 105th Cong. § 302 (1997).
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uniformity-not merely for a miscategorized margin, but for all
children whose cases do not move at an appropriate pace.
Regarding the adoption timetable, Congress may also have
resisted age-based distinctions in an effort to reform the way
that agencies treat older children. Many state agencies now do
not even seek to find adoptive placements for many older chil-
dren.199 That practice has been harshly criticized by adoption
advocates who emphasize that "[n]o child is unadoptable."200 It
is possible that if states follow ASFA's mandates for improved
interstate adoption practices and more advance planning, more
older children will be adopted.201 Others pin their hopes on the
Multi-Ethnic Placement Act (MEPA).202 From these perspec-
tives, any distinction among children by age would only rein-
force bad practices.
The argument based on MEPA is not persuasive. It is un-
clear how many white adults would adopt American children of
different races even if they had the opportunity.203 More to the
point, even if MEPA is enforced,204 and even if there is great in-
terest among whites in adopting minority children, the 'huge
and independent" effect of age on adoption rates would re-
main. 205 Relying on MEPA to justify ASFA ignores the distinct
role of age in adoption decisionmaldng.
A more general response is that the goals of reforming
agency practices and respecting children's needs are not mutu-
ally exclusive. ASFA could have encouraged vast reforms in
agency adoption practices even if it had treated younger and
older children differently. Though President Clinton's stated
goal is to increase the number of annual agency adoptions by
199. See, e.g., Conna Craig, "What I Need Is a Mom": The Welfare State
Denies Homes to Thousands of Foster Children, 73 POL1Y REV. 41 (1995).
200. See id.; Charmaine Crouse Yoest, "No Child Is Unadoptable", 75
POL Y REV. 13 (1997).
201. Interview with Richard P. Barth, Professor, University of California
at Berkeley School of Social Work (Apr. 20, 1997).
202. Cf. Bartholet, supra note 134, at 1203. For a description of MEPA,
see supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing the passage of M[EPA
which sought to ban delays of adoption resulting from race-matching efforts).
203. See R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Par-
ents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J.
875, 881 n.20 (1998) ("The overwhelming majority of adults seeking to adopt
are white and few of these adults would consider adopting a black child.").
204- But see Elizabeth Bartholet, Private Race Preferences in Family For-
mation, 107 YALE L.J. 2351, 2356 (1998).
205. Barth, supra note 111, at 296.
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27,000 between 1997 and 2002,206 adoptions doubled to this
level would not even equal the surplus of terminations over
adoptions in 1996 (more than 30,000).207 In addition, there are
tens or hundreds of thousands of children now not free for
adoption who have been in foster care for more than fifteen
months.208 Any acceleration of processes would have sent a
powerful signal that encouraged states to act, and a vast pool
of children could have benefited. A more targeted acceleration
could also have encouraged states to act sensibly and helped
the children who most need help.
Ironically, while making a symbolic gesture toward finding
adoptive families for older children, Congress failed to take a
practical step in the same direction. Researchers have found
that post-adoption placement services like education and sup-
port can help adoptive parents adjust to raising older children
and children with emotional problems.2 09 But federal law re-
imburses post-adoptive services in the same parsimonious way
as assistance with reunification.21 0 Beyond allowing states to
dip into their very limited funding for family preservation,211
Congress did nothing to expand reimbursement of adoption
services. Adoption of older children thus remains a significant
challenge.
C. SUMMARY
The confused treatment of services and the disregard for
age-based distinctions seriously undermine ASFA's ability to
guide states toward two of Congress's major goals. Because of
ASFA's inadequate supportive services, children are needlessly
at risk of experiencing foster care drift, either remaining in fos-
ter care unnecessarily or returning home and then to care after
episodes of reabuse. Because ASFA encourages the denial of
206. See ADOPTION 2002, supra note 51, at 1.
207. See Conna Craig & Derek Herbert, The State of the Children: An Ex-
amination of Government-Run Foster Care (visited Apr. 20, 1998) <http://
www.public-policy.org/ncpa/studies/s210 /s210.html>.
208. At the end of 1996, 500,000 children were in foster care. See Rusak-
off, supra note 61, at A22. The median stay of children in foster care in 1996
was two years. See Rusakoff, supra note 62, at A23. It is difficult to estimate
the number of children in care more than 15 months because of the biases of
cross-sectional data like the median figure. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 91,
at 81-82.
209. See Barth & Berry, supra note 100, at 338-39.
210. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.60(c) (1997).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 629(a)(8) (1994).
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adoptive homes based on services shortages, moves young chil-
dren through the system too slowly, and seeks quick disposi-
tions for older children with less to gain from them, young
children who could be adopted will also be denied the opportu-
nity. Too many children of all ages drifting through foster care
and too few being adopted was not the promise of this "children
first" legislation.
III. HOW ASFA WILL FAIL CHILDREN IN PRACTICE
Part II made several assumptions about state implementa-
tion of ASFA. It assumed that states would read the excep-
tions to the mandatory termination provisions to discourage or
preclude adoptions in the excepted circumstances. It assumed
that states would not substantially make up for the shortfall of
funding for social services. And it assumed that states would
move children through the termination process at the same
uniform rate as Congress prescribed.
But states have tremendous discretion in implementing
the new law. It is possible that they will administer ASFA in a
manner that helps children by limiting the impact of ASFA's
mistakes-declining to terminate parental rights for children
who are likely never to be adopted, for example, or increasing
funding for preventive services. But it is also possible that
state practice will exacerbate ASFA's flaws.
This part argues that three factors-state ideologies, in-
terests, and incentives-will all generate a minimalist inter-
pretation of ASFA that alters current practice as little as pos-
sible. Although attitudes are now changing, state agencies
have long had strong ideologies of family preservation.212
These views cannot conjure up services for which support does
not exist, but they can motivate aggressive uses of the excep-
tions to the mandatory termination provision in ASFA. In ad-
dition, agencies have an interest in preserving the status quo
because implementing ASFA aggressively would require staff
time and money that do not exist.213 Finally, agencies have a
structural interest in preserving current practices in order to
maintain the flow of funds on which the agencies rely.214
The forces favoring minimalism are likely to have both
costs and benefits. The benefit is that states do not have rea-
212. See infra Part III.B.1.
213. See infra Part M.B.2.
214. See infra Part 1mI.B.3.
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sons to create increasing numbers of older legal orphans. The
costs are continued failure to provide services to prevent family
breakdown or to place adoptable children for adoption.
A. STATE DISCRETION TO MINIMIZE ASFA's EFFECTS
State power to minimize ASFA's effects derives from two
sources. First, for several critical outcomes seemingly man-
dated by ASFA, there exist significant exceptions. Although
the exceptions may be helpful in allowing states to do justice to
unusual cases, they also empower states to evade congressional
intent. Second, even where ASFA mandates processes aimed
at certain outcomes, it does not mandate the outcomes in ques-
tion. States can use the new processes to achieve the old out-
comes. The combination of exceptions to rules and limits on
processes leaves ASFA powerless to achieve its basic goals of
reducing drift and promoting adoption.
Although not the focus of this Article, the limitations on
reasonable efforts in ASFA offer an instructive introduction to
the statute's slipperiness. The law states that reasonable ef-
forts "shall not be required to be made" in violent and aggra-
vating circumstances, not that such efforts may not be made.215
Though an agency now cannot be statutorily compelled to pro-
vide reasonable efforts in these cases, it still has the discretion
to make those efforts. An agency acting by choice would not be
"required" to do anything. Moreover, once an agency has be-
gun to make reasonable efforts, it can bypass the permanency
hearing that is required within thirty days when reasonable
efforts are not made.216 Agencies can thus continue to make ef-
forts to reunify, and continue to bypass expedited permanency
hearings, for as many children as they wish.
Similarly, the three sets of procedural reforms in perma-
nency planning need not improve state efforts to prevent mul-
tiple long-term placements. Exceptions to the mandatory time-
table render it toothless, even when potential adoptive parents
are already caring for a child. After fifteen months, states can
expansively define the reasonable efforts that should have been
215. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (emphasis added).
216. See id. § 671(a)(15)(E). There is even an argument that if agencies
can offer reasonable efforts and bypass the expedited hearing on a case-by-
case basis, courts can also order agencies to make such efforts. On this inter-
pretation, reasonable efforts "shall not be required" only as a matter of state
law, not as a matter of court order.
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made and not pursue terminations in their absence,217 or they
can utilize their infinite latitude not to terminate based on "a
compelling reason" related to the child's best interests.21 8 Al-
though the case plan documenting such a reason must be
"available for court review," there is no requirement of a judi-
cial hearing or finding.219 Much like the reasonable efforts pro-
vision, the mandatory termination clause necessarily applies to
no one at all.
The reform of the "permanency hearing" can be emptied of
meaning. Although the statute no longer explicitly authorizes
short-term foster care, i.e., that the child "should be continued
in foster care for a specified period,"220 it effectively allows just
the same. States must determine a permanency "plan" for the
child, but both the date and the fact of permanency are left en-
tirely to state discretion.221 If the date is far in the future and
the specified goal is unlikely to be realized, then short-term
foster care will have effectively been authorized. Similarly, al-
though the statute no longer authorizes "foster care on a per-
manent or long-term basis" because of the child's "special needs
or circumstances,"222 it still allows "another planned perma-
nent living arrangement" besides reunification, adoption, kin-
ship care, or guardianship if there is a "compelling reason."2
The most familiar example of "another planned permanent
living arrangement" is long-term foster care. Judges can
surely believe that the "special needs or circumstances" for-
merly justifying long-term foster care also furnish a
"compelling reason" for such care. Hence the "permanency
hearing" can produce all of the same outcomes as the
"dispositional hearing" of the past.
With regard to other dimensions of the permanency plan-
ning reforms, the potential for minimization comes less from
the statutory language than from the inherently limited nature
of the procedural changes. For example, the Act requires
217. See id. § 675(E)(iii).
218. Id. § 675(E)(ii).
219. Id For evidence that even a mandatory finding process can become a
rote exercise, see infra note 229 and accompanying text.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C).
221. See id. (requiring "permanency plan... that includes whether, and if





states to speed up "permanency hearings."224 Though hasten-
ing these hearings may be helpful when agencies have the
commitment and capacity to find permanent placements, it has
not historically hastened permanency. By mid-1996, twenty-
six states had already reduced the deadline for the disposi-
tional hearing below eighteen months, yet studies reported
that the level of foster care drift had not palpably declined.2 25
When agencies do not have permanent placements or do not
want to make them, faster may not mean better.
In like fashion, states can formally take the steps to adop-
tion mandated by ASFA without actually increasing adoptions.
For example, states can bring necessary terminations of paren-
tal rights, but unless attorneys and caseworkers are superbly
prepared, these terminations will take a long time and fail in
large numbers.226 In addition, the fact that states must make
efforts to place children for adoption offers no guarantee that
children will find adoptive parents.227 Thus, even if the state
does initiate terminations and attempt to find adoptive place-
ments, the result can still be extended judicial hearings, failure
to terminate, or failure to adopt-all of which will reproduce
the drift under current law.
To elaborate upon these opportunities to minimize ASFA's
effects is not necessarily to criticize ASFA. For one thing, some
of the possibilities are byproducts of the discretion necessary to
do justice in individual cases. If correctly used, this discretion
could temper ASFA's mistakes. Most importantly, even where
the discretion is not so useful, the fact that states can evade
ASFA's intentions does not mean that they will. That depends
on incentives and interests at the state level.
B. STATE INCENTVES TO MINIMIZE ASFA's EFFECTS
Recent history suggests that states often do minimize the
impact of federal child welfare statutes. The Child Welfare Act
conditioned federal reimbursement of foster care expenditures
on judges' approval of reunification efforts at early hearings on
placement, not only at a termination of parental rights hear-
224. See id.
225. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 68, at 10, 22-23; Con-
gressional Budget Office, Pay-As-You-Go Estimate: H.R. 867, Adoption & Safe
Families Act of 1997 (visited Nov. 24, 1997) <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfin?
index=340&from=2&sequence=O>.
226. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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ing.228 Yet in order to assure continued federal funding, courts
regularly rubber stamp agency efforts as "reasonable," some-
times on preprinted court order forms.229 Similarly, in 1980,
Congress intended that courts would make final decisions re-
garding most children at the scheduled dispositional hear-
ing.230 State agencies, however, have regularly proposed, and
courts have approved, the continuation of temporary foster
care from one hearing to the next.23' On the basis of this his-
tory, one need not be a cynic to worry about state implementa-
tion of ASFA.
Recent history suggests three distinct reasons that explain
why implementation of ASFA is likely to lag behind intention:
ideologies of family preservation, short-term interests in
avoiding the additional work that vigorous implementation
would require, and structural interests in maintaining the flow
of funds derived from current practices.
1. Ideology of Family Preservation
State agencies already have a proven record of undermin-
ing the Child Welfare Act because of their unyielding, one-
sided belief in reunification. The drafters of the Act clearly
stated that agencies should not make reasonable efforts that
endanger children's health or well-being.232  After advocates
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1); Allen et al., supra note 29, at 585. Because
the Child Welfare Act did not envision terminations of parental rights for all
children in federally subsidized foster care, see supra notes 34-39 and accom-
panying text, the Act necessarily contemplated that the "judicial determina-
tion" concerning reasonable efforts would be made at a hearing prior to termi-
nation.
229. See NO PLACE TO CALL HOME, supra note 150, at 55; Mark Hardin,
Ten Years Later: Implementation of Public Law 96-272 by the Courts, in THE
FIRST TEN YEARS, supra note 33, at 51, 54; Shotton, supra note 54, at 227.
It is important to emphasize that the rote review occurs in custody, ne-
glect, and permanency hearings prior to the termination proceeding. At that
proceeding-but only at that proceeding-courts do take the reasonable ef-
forts requirement seriously. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
This behavior is the expression of a family reunification ideology trapped in-
side a system without resources to support serious efforts to reunify families.
See infra Part HI.B.1.
230. See supra text accompanying note 38.
231. See Hardin, supra note 229, at 56; Improving the Well-Being of
Abused and Neglected Children, supra note 10, at 29.
232. See H.R. REP. No. 96-136, at 47 (1979), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448 ("[The Committee recognizes that the preventive services
requirement would be inappropriate in certain specific circumstances. This
would be the case where the home situation presents a substantial and imme-
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expressed concerns about state compliance with this mandate,
federal regulations under the Act stated unequivocally: "The
safety and well-being of children and of all family members is
paramount."23 3 In spite of these injunctions, in 1997 Congress
learned that states still sometimes sent children back into
households that no amount of family preservation could help.23 4
Because funding for family preservation is so often paltry, this
record can only reflect commitment to family reunification re-
gardless of circumstance.
Corresponding to this belief is a widely shared view that
adoption represents failure. The Child Welfare Act allowed
states to engage in concurrent planning, or planning for adop-
tion while also attempting reunification.235 Though such ad-
vance planning has been a cornerstone of proper efforts to find
permanent placements for some time, only a few states engage
in it.236 Numerous studies confirm that social workers and
judges often strain mightily to avoid severing a child's bonds to
her parents, even when doing so would ultimately benefit a
child.237
diate danger to a child which would not be mitigated by the provision of pre-
ventive services."). The earliest comprehensive analysis of the Child Welfare
Act, by a family advocate, did not neglect this point. See Allen et al., supra
note 29, at 589-90; see also Shotton, supra note 54, at 227-28.
233. 45 C.F.R. 1355.25(a) (1997); see also Foster Care Maintenance Pay-
ments, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,632, 58,636 (1996) ("[We reiterate that Tamily preser-
vation' does NOT mean that the family must stay together or 'be preserved'
under all circumstances, or at the expense of the safety and well-being of the
child."); Family Preservation and Support Services Program: Proposed Rule,
59 Fed. Reg. 50,646, 50,647 (1994) ("If a child cannot be protected from harm
without placement, family preservation services are not appropriate.").
234. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
235. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(1)(A)-(B) (1994) (elaborating requirements for
"case plan" and nowhere requiring that plans be pursued only sequentially).
236. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 68, at 10; GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 46, at 23 n.14.
237. See, e.g., BARTH ET AL., supra note 91, at 263 ("[Slocial workers andjudges have never really believed in sufficient numbers that having a lifetime
family was really important.... [They] find a hundred excuses for denying
children adoptive homes."); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note
144, at 16 (stating that 'judicial biases" against termination of parental rights
"often result in delays"); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 68, at 15(noting that caseworkers "viewed terminating parental rights as a failure on
their part because they were not able to reunify the family"); Herring, supra
note 30, at 181-82 (noting social workers' "aversion to the conflict involved in a
termination proceeding" and the "natural leaning of juvenile court judges to
give the parents 'one more chance"); Wald, supra note 95, at 693 ("Manyjudges, and child care workers, appear to be unwilling, on emotional grounds,
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To be sure, these attitudes have been changing, 8 and
ASFA will shift priorities further. But given the status quo in-
clination of bureaucracies23 9 and the bias of social workers as a
professional group,240 such change can only come slowly. In
fact, in the absence of new support for services, ASFA's effort to
promote permanency through adoption may only steel profes-
sionals' resolve to resist rules apparently unconcerned about
parental needs. Although its force is diminishing with time,
this ideology of reunification creates one important barrier to
ASFA's efforts to limit reasonable efforts and promote adop-
tion.
2. Short-Term Interest in Avoiding Workload Increases
Every facet of the child welfare system is now overbur-
dened. Social workers and their supervisors regularly handle
more cases than recommended by licensing organizations:241 in
some jurisdictions, more than four times more.242 Legal profes-
sionals face similar conditions;243 reporters have compared
hearings in the overwhelmed juvenile courts to cattle calls.2"
Federal law has contributed to this state system overload.
The Child Welfare Act tripled the number of issues to which
lawyers and judges must attend in juvenile court proceed-
ings.245 As the quality of judicial hearings ultimately depends
on the quality of casework, the expansion of hearings has re-
quired considerably more paperwork from social workers,
24
who now must know and document far more about children
to permanently sever parental ties, even when it is clear that reunion will not
occur.").
238. See Louise A. Leduc, Note, No-Fault Termination of Parental Rights
in Connecticut: A Substantive Due Process Analysis, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1195,
1195-97 (1996) (discussing changes in Connecticut); Jill Sheldon, Note, 50,000
Children Are Waiting: Permanency, Planning, and Termination of Parental
Rights Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 17 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 73, 85-88 (1997) (discussing trend nationwide).
239. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE
POLITICS OF PARENTING 71 (1993).
240. See id. at 70-81.
241. See PETIT & CURTIS, supra note 124, at 172-74 tbls. 5.7 & 5.8.
242. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 112, at 19.
243. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
244. See Gibeaut, supra note 192, at 2.
245. See MARK HARDIN, JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY
PLANNING REFORM: ONE COURT THAT WORKS 9-10 (1992).
246. Cf. Herring, supra note 30, at 179-81 (describing social workers' deep
involvement in court proceedings).
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than previously.247 These burdens limit the capacity of the
child welfare system to absorb new demands. 248
Child welfare officials have a practical interest in mini-
mizing the impact of a new law that further increases their
workloads. Under ASFA, states categorically must do certain
things, such as speeding up permanency hearings. 249 Such re-
quirements will expend more legal resources regardless of
whether they improve child outcomes. With the diminished
capacity that remains, states will have to choose whether to
vigorously implement discretionary provisions of ASFA.
More vigor means more work. For example, if states at-
tempt to avoid offering parents "reasonable efforts" under an
exception for special crimes or aggravating circumstances, par-
ents can demand a judicial determination that such services be
provided.250 If the parents lose, then the state must hold an
expedited "permanency hearing" and make reasonable efforts
to place the child in adoptive care.251 Although the nature of
the latter work will vary, it may be just as demanding as reuni-
fication services, and it will also be relatively new to agen-
cies.252 Maintaining current practice will always be easier,
avoiding a messy court issue, more hearings, and unfamiliar
work.
247. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 675(1) (1994) (requiring "case plan" for each child
and setting forth extensive list of required components of such plans).
248. Cf. JOHN M. HAGEDORN, FORSAKING OUR CHILDREN: BUREAUCRAcY
AND REFORM IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 25-31 (1995) (describing extent
to which "paperwork and courtwork" dominate social workers' routines and
prevent innovative service delivery).
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C). Other new mandates in ASFA include
criminal records checks for adoptive and foster parents, see id. § 671(a)(20),
and new standards for the health and safety of foster placements. See id. §
671(a)(22).
250. When exceptions do not apply, the state still has discretion not to
provide reasonable efforts to serve the child's health and safety. See 42 U.S.C.§ 678 ("Nothing in this part shall be construed as precluding State courts from
exercising their discretion to protect the health and safety of children in indi-
vidual cases, including cases other than those described in [the exceptions].").
But given the requirement that exceptions to the reasonable efforts require-
ment be made pursuant to a determination by a "court of competent jurisdic-
tion," see id. § 675(a)(15)(D), a parent can demand that a court ultimately en-
dorse a decision not to provide services.
251. See id. § 671(a)(E)(i).
252. The requirement of reasonable efforts to find an adoptive placement is
new, see 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), and the services needed to make those efforts




Vigorously implementing ASFA's measures to promote
adoption would similarly tax state legal systems. While the
decision to leave a child in foster care requires five or ten min-
utes of court time, the effort to terminate parental rights is ex-
ponentially more intensive. 253 Lawyers and social workers
simply looking to stay afloat may be forced to let children con-
tinue drifting through foster care.
To be sure, vigorously implementing ASFA might ulti-
mately limit state workloads by reducing the number of chil-
dren in foster care. That benefit, however, is for now a specu-
lative long-term possibility of which state officials are deeply
dubious. It would require either significant expansion in re-
unification efforts, for which agencies lack resources,254 or ma-
jor expansion of adoption efforts, to which officials are ideologi-
cally resistant.255  Given both the long history of failed
attempts to reduce caseloads and the lack of service support for
permanent placements, state officials reasonably focus on the
immediate burden of more hearings and paperwork, not the
possibility of caseload reductions in the future.256 The percep-
tion that ASFA will further burden already overburdened pro-
fessionals is a second barrier to implementation.
3. Structural Interest in Maintaining Foster Care Caseloads
Even if reducing the number of children in costly foster
care would reduce financial burdens at the state level,
257 it
would also limit the funding on which state agencies rely. A
very large share of state agencies' funding-sometimes three-
quarters-typically depends on the number of children in fos-
ter care.258 The main reason for this reliance is the disparity in
253. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part IH.A.
256. See Letter from Nancy Miller, Court Improvement Grant Administra-
tor, State of Oregon, to Robert M. Gordon (Apr. 21, 1998) (stating, in response
to the claim that ASFA will save money, that "[w]e are always VERY hesitant
to use the term 'savings' because... we always see our docket time back fill
with something immediately when something else clears") (on file with
author).
257. The disparity between foster care and adoption costs should not be
overemphasized. Many foster adoptions are subsidized, and the costs of home
studies and termination hearings prior to adoption are substantial. See
BARTH ET AL., supra note 91, at 263.
258. See Promoting Adoption, supra note 154, at 68 (statement of Dr. Fred
C. Wulczyn).
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the federal funding scheme between capped, paltry funding for
services and uncapped, unlimited reimbursement of foster care
expenses. 259 By limiting both support for caseload reduction
and financial exposure for long-term foster care, this funding
mechanism reduces the incentive that state governments
would otherwise have to move children out of costly state care.
A handful of state governments still encourage agencies to pur-
sue adoption and reunification by supporting services more
richly than does the federal government,2 60 or by capitating
payments to agencies under a federal waiver.26' But these
practices are anomalies: the vast majority of states provide in-
adequate resources for child welfare services 262 and still pay for
foster care on a per diem basis.263 Because state agencies thus
must rely on foster care to fund themselves, they would suffer
financially from concerted efforts to reduce the number of chil-
dren in foster care through either reunifications or adoptions.
ASFA attempts to shift the incentives facing state agencies
through adoption bonus payments, but these bonuses are too
small to have a significant impact. The law offers $20 million
259. See infra notes 271-76 and accompanying text. The reimbursement
rate for foster care administrative expenses is 50%; for foster care mainte-
nance payments it is the Medicaid matching rate. See 42 U.S.C. § 674(a)(1994). The latter rate ranges from 50% in most large states to 77% in a few
states. See 62 Fed. Reg. 62,613, 62,614 (1997).
260. Telephone Interview with Rob Geen, Policy Analyst, the Urban Insti-
tute (May 5, 1998).
261. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS app. I, at 1 (1998) (listing only five states that
capitate payments). As Part IV.A infra discusses in detail, capitation means
payment per child, rather than payment per service. Because adoption and
reunification are less costly per child than foster care, capitation encourages
long-term placements. It also has serious pitfalls, especially the promotion of
low-cost, dangerous treatment of children.
262. See GEEN & WATERS, supra note 20. For data from one state bearing
out this view, see Fred H. Wulczyn, Child Welfare Reform, Managed Care,
and Community Reinvestment, in CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES IN BIG
CITIES: STRATEGIES FOR SERVICE REFORM 199, 211 (Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila
B. Kamerman eds., 1996) (showing that "[tihe disparity in spending on foster
care versus in-home services found in New York reflects the same approxi-
mate spending pattern found in the way the federal government finances child
welfare services"). State budgets for child welfare services seriously suffered
during the budgetary crises of the early 1990s. See Douglas J. Besharov, Epi-
logue to WHEN DRUG ADDICTS HAVE CHILDREN, REORIENTING CHILD
WELFARE'S RESPONSE 249, 249-50 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1994) (reporting
that more than 30 states had frozen child welfare spending, and that cuts of
20 and 30% were common).
263. See Promoting Adoption, supra note 154 (statements of Dr. Fred C.
Wulczyn and Maureen K. Hogan).
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per year in incentive payments264-two-tenths of one percent of
the $10 billion that governments spend on foster care alone
each year.265 For the average state that earns the average level
of reimbursement, the subsidy promises to increase the federal
share of the state child welfare budget by less than one-half of
one percent.266 Even if such a state makes a big push and
raises its adoption rate by the stunning amount of fifty percent,
and even if other states do not make similar efforts that dis-
perse the incentive pool, the state would still add less than one-
and-a-half percent to its federal child welfare budget.
267
Notwithstanding the adoption incentive, therefore, most
state agencies continue to rely heavily on large foster care
caseloads for their budgets. Though vigorous implementation
of ASFA might reduce those caseloads, it would diminish agen-
cies' already limited resources. In fact, to the extent that fam-
ily preservation advocates can often hope only to preserve pa-
rental rights, not to reunify families, the funding regime makes
this downsized agenda financially advantageous. Agency
funding would seriously suffer if states permanently moved
children out of foster care. Federal funding thus supplies a
further reason that states are not likely to implement ASFA
vigorously.
C. SUMMARY
Given the opportunities, ideologies, and interests de-
scribed in this part, states are likely to implement ASFA in a
way that minimizes its effects. The results will be mixed. The
state response will reduce the risk that Congress has "gone too
far." Older children in particular will not suffer terminations
of parental rights without adoptions in the numbers that Con-
gress's careless drafting might have generated. But the lax
implementation of ASFA will also limit the rewards of Con-
gress's having gone as far as it did. States do not have incen-
tives even to move as fast as Congress suggested in placing
young children for adoption. Rather, they have every reason to
maintain the high levels of drift and low levels of adoption that
motivated ASFA in the first place.
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(h) (1994).
265. See GELLES, supra note 59, at 131.




ASFA's limited impact may help explain its broad support.
On its face, ASFA is a controversial step: a micromanagerial
federal intervention in a domain of traditional state sover-
eignty that aims to impose strict limits on state aid to troubled
families. ASFA's structural weakness may have palliated both
political groups that would ordinarily oppose such a measure.
Conservatives who ordinarily guard state sovereignty could
console themselves that ASFA really requires very little.268
And liberals who usually decry punishing the poor could hope
that most states would never accomplish the terminations of
parental rights apparently mandated by the law.269 ASFA's
weakness might then be the secret of both its political success
and its programmatic failure.
IV. RENEWING ASFA'S PROISE
In their landmark work, Goldstein and his co-authors cau-
tioned that professionals who seek to serve children must be
"softhearted and hardheaded."2 0 The Congress that passed
ASFA had some of both qualities. It had the decency to recog-
nize that children suffer from shifting placements and the
courage to encourage tougher timetables. Yet ASFA is greatly
diminished by the insensitivity of its specific provisions toward
children's developmental needs and the indifference of its
funding structure to the incentives of state agencies. Congress
finally proved too hardhearted toward children and too soft-
headed toward agencies.
This part suggests several measures to improve the re-
sponsiveness of federal law to children's developmental needs
and agencies' structural interests. As Part I suggested, state
interests and incentives can thwart even the best-designed
procedural changes, so the discussion begins with financial re-
form. It then moves to procedural measures. In tandem, these
changes would help achieve two of ASFA's central goals: send-
ing more children home more quickly and placing more chil-
dren for adoption.
268. But see Toby Eckert & Dori Meinert, LaHood: Adoption Law Infringes
on States, ST. J. REG., Jan. 2, 1998, at 13 (quoting Rep. Ray LaHood, one of
seven House members to vote against the adoption act, as saying "I do not be-
lieve in federalizing the adoption system").
269. But see 143 CONG. REC. H2023 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Mink) (opposing the Act because it makes "poverty and lack of work...
the sole basis for the termination of parental rights").
270. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 218.
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A. REFORMING FEDERAL FINANCING
Unlike the supporters of ASFA, the Congress that enacted
the Child Welfare Act of 1980 acutely understood the impor-
tance of incentives in the child welfare system.271 The Child
Welfare Act contained a clumsy but well-intentioned mecha-
nism that limited increases in state foster care maintenance
payments to ten percent per year and allowed states to transfer
unused funds below the caps to services programs.272 The caps
only became operative, however, if federal child welfare serv-
ices were fmded at the full authorization level.273 These serv-
ices were never so funded after 1981,274 and Congress elimi-
nated the incentive provisions altogether in 1994.275 Although
mistaken in critical details, these provisions reflect an insight
that remains valid: reform of federal financing is essential to
improving child welfare outcomes.
The combination of too little money for services and too
much for foster care suggests that a solution might not require
new funding, a welcome possibility in today's political cli-
mate.276 Yet realignment of funding must also negotiate sev-
eral obstacles. First, if support for foster care, services, or both
together is limited, funds must be allocated to states and
among them in a way that protects against uncontrollable
growth in foster care caseloads. Federal policy should discour-
age states from leaving children in foster care too long, not
from taking endangered children into care in the first instance.
Second, the allocation of funds under a cap should not repro-
duce the incentives under current law to leave children in fos-
ter care or, worse, create new incentives to put children in care.
Third, a realignment should offer states the appropriate
amount of flexibility: enough to provide various kinds of serv-
ices, but not so much as to allow diversion of funds to more po-
27L See H.R. REP. No. 96-136, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1448, 1450 (stating, in first sentence describing purpose of Child Welfare Act,
that "the incentive structure of present law is modified to lessen the emphasis
on foster care placement").
272. See Child Welfare Act of 1980 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 674(b)(4)(B) (Supp.
1981)).
273. See id. § 674(b)(2)(A).
274. See 1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 20, at 699 tbl.12-5.
275. See Social Security Act Amendments, Pub L. 103-432, § 207, 108 Stat.
4398, 4457 (1994).
276. The discussion that follows assumes Congress would keep overall
child welfare funding at its currently projected levels.
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litically popular programs. The following discussion explores
ways to reform the system within these constraints.
1. The Risks of Global Solutions
The most obvious way to realign incentives would be to
combine funding for services and foster care in a single stream
of money that states can use as they please. Although not or-
dinarily presented as such, a decategorized funding system
could in principle maintain generous spending levels and pre-
serve federal substantive guarantees for case planning, case
review, and so on.277 Such a system would eliminate the dis-
proportional federal support for foster care, and reduce the
costs of administrative compliance for both state and federal
governments.
In 1995, the House of Representatives passed a problem-
atic bill that would have consolidated federal funding for child
welfare into a block grant, a lump sum of funding available for
services as well as foster care.278 By eliminating any matching
mechanism, that proposal would have forced states to bear the
full marginal cost of any expenditures on child welfare.279
Relative to the current regime, that would discourage not only
excessive foster care expenditures, but also foster care and so-
cial services expenditures of any kind, reducing child safety as
well as drift.
A marginally better prospect would be a matching grant
system under which states receive the same level of federal
reimbursement for their expenditures on both services and fos-
ter care up to a limit. By eliminating the advantage of foster
care over preventive services in the federal funding scheme,
such a system might encourage states to shift efforts toward
277. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements,
and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
297, 301-04 (1996); William A. Morrill, Getting Beyond the Micro "Gee Whiz":•
Can Innovative Service Change the Service System?, in CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES IN BIG CITIES, supra note 262, at 185, 195.
278. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 112, at 23.
279. See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 277, at 299. Maintenance-of-effort
provisions can force states to spend their money within the block grant
framework, but these provisions typically do not require states to maintain all
of their current spending levels or to keep up with inflation. See Steven D.
Gold, Issues Raised by the New Federalism, 49 NATL TAX J. 273, 275 (1996).
If the maintenance-of-effort provisions are stringent, then the program in ef-
fect becomes a capped entitlement with matching. That more appealing pros-
pect is discussed below.
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services. However, by preserving the rich and constant level of
reimbursement for foster care, such a system would not neces-
sarily disrupt state practices of letting children linger in care.
States uninterested in reform would not have to do so.
More fundamentally, a matching system would also create
intolerable dangers. Because a matching program requires
limitation on total funding (as in a block grant), states would
likely face severe adequacy and equity problems. Historically,
Congress has used the consolidation of funding streams as an
opportunity for cost-cutting.2 0 If that happened here, states
would be left without adequate funding for services or foster
care, much as under the block grant proposal.281
Furthermore, even if Congress were prepared to create an
adequate global ceiling, there would be no sensible way to limit
total funding over time or to allocate funds equitably under the
cap. The ideal variable to which to tie both the global funding
level and each state's share would be demand for foster care
and related services. A policy based on attempted measure-
ment of that demand, however, would both destroy the integ-
rity of the measurement and introduce perverse new incen-
tives. For example, foster care caseloads might model demand
for services quite well, but tying overall funding to those
caseloads would encourage states to keep children in care.
That is the undesirable situation under current law, and it
would be exacerbated by a decategorized funding system that
allowed states to obtain per diem reimbursements for services
as well as foster care. Using admissions to foster care as the
proxy for demand would eliminate the incentive to keep chil-
dren in care, but it would introduce a vast new inducement to
take children into foster care in the first instance. Another
seemingly plausible proxy is the number of substantiated child
280. See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); Morrill, supra note
277, at 195.
281. See Audrey Burnam & Elan Melamid, Child Protection and Welfare
Reform (visited Apr. 20, 1998) <http'/www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF123/
burnam/index.html> (noting that under H.R. 4, funding for child protection
was not likely "to keep pace with growth in demand for child protective serv-
ices if the trends of the last decade continue"); S. REP. No. 96-336, at 155-56
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1559-61 (additional views of
Sens. Heinz and Danforth) (criticizing proposed cap because, among other
things "a 'cap' on foster care is simply not flexible enough to take into account
increased costs in food, heating, and clothing due to inflation; additional num-
bers eligible for AFDC because of voluntary placements... and increased de-
mand resulting from success in locating and helping abused children").
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abuse reports. That number does not correlate strongly with
demand for services,282 however, and as a basis for policy it
would create a perverse incentive for states to intervene ag-
gressively but offensively in more families.283 One California
researcher has identified some factors beyond the control of
state child welfare agencies (though not of states as wholes)
that do correlate with the number of children who are mis-
treated or in foster care.28 4 Even if her results held nationwide,
two powerful variables, number of births and number of drug
arrests, 285 offer politically untenable grounds for increasing
funding.2 86 The only workable bases for funding, therefore,
would be the kinds now used, such as past expenditures and
poverty rates,287 and these do not predict caseload growth with
much accuracy.288
An inadequate global cap would create risks greater than
those accepted by Congress in the 1996 welfare law. Whatever
the merits of the cap in that law at that time, a similar cap for
child welfare today would be much more dangerous precisely
because of the welfare reform. Child welfare is now all that
remains of the safety net for poor children whose parents can-
not cope in the new regime.289 With diminished resources and
increasing needs under a capped grant, cash-strapped states
would be forced to choose between leaving more endangered
282. Even when abuse or neglect is substantiated, the state may not pro-
vide services because the problem is too small or already resolved. Suchjudgments are products of conditions and policies that vary greatly among
states. See Jeanne Giovannoni & William Meezan, Rethinking Supply and
Demand in Child Welfare, 17 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REv. 465, 465-67(1995); Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, If CPS Is Driving Child Wel-fare-Where Do We Go From Here?, 48 PUB. WELFARE 9, 9-11 (1990).
283. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
284. See Vicky Albert, Explaining the Growing Number of Child Abuse and
Neglect Reports and the Growing Foster Care Caseload, in 1 CHILD WELFARE
RESEARCH REVIEW, supra note 45, at 218, 235-38.
285. See id.
286. It is inconceivable that Congress would give a state more money be-
cause its citizens had more babies or more drug problems. Moreover, correct
prediction of caseloads depends on complex mathematical formulas. See id. at
233. On inclusion of variables such as the number of female-headed families
and number of births to persons of color, see id. at 235-36. These factors do
not add to the plausibility of using such data as a basis for forecasting.
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 629c(c) (1994).
288. See id.; Tatara, supra note 45, at 139-42.
289. See COURTNEY, supra note 21, at 17 (noting that children whose par-
ents are "unable or unwilling to find work" are "likely to end up in foster fam-
ily care or group care").
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children with increasingly desperate parents 290 and focusing on
child safety to the exclusion of reunification or adoption.
291
Protecting child safety and promoting permanency were both
goals of ASFA, and forcing states to choose between them
makes no sense.
The federal government has granted five states waivers to
operate child welfare systems using global budgets. 292 These
waivers create negotiated, revocable, three to five year caps. 293
Policies crafted by Congress for all fifty states are much
tougher to revise than these temporary demonstrations negoti-
ated by an executive agency for five states. While studying the
experience in these demonstrations, Congress should pursue
other, less risky approaches.
2. Limiting Reimbursement for Long-Term Foster Care
The preceding emphasis on unpredictable increases in de-
mand suggests a different approach to limiting foster care ex-
penditures: retaining the entitlement to foster care, but re-
ducing the reimbursement rate as a child spends more time in
state care. This approach would preserve current protection
for entries into foster care, but reduce protection as stays in
foster care continue. The rationale is twofold. First, although
public policy properly seeks to minimize unnecessary entries
into foster care and protracted stays in such care, entries more
often benefit children than protracted stays in such care. En-
tries often prevent serious harm; in fact, they most often be-
come harmful only when they grow into the prolonged stays
that so often involve multiple placements. 294 Reducing entries
would therefore be a much more ambiguous achievement than
reducing the length of stays. Second, states have greater con-
trol over the duration of care. In order to prevent entry, the
child welfare system has one major tool: family preservation.
Family preservation, however, is the child welfare service that
290. See Giovannoni & Meezan, supra note 282, at 467 (discussing how
states already often leave children in homes not regarded as safe by commu-
nity members).
29L See Burnam & Melamid, supra note 281, at 18 (predicting that as a
result of combined welfare and child welfare reforms, "the ability of the child
protective system to prevent out-of-home placement, triage children into
least-restrictive settings, and arrange for permanent placements will de-
cline").
292. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 261, app. III.
293. See id.
294. See supra notes 93-101, 105-12 and accompanying text.
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has been proven least effective. It is not appropriate for many
families; and given the suddenness of many entries into care, it
is a service that not even the best system could make univer-
sally available.295 Once a child is in foster care, by contrast, the
state can carefully plan multiple permanent options, including
reunification, adoption, and guardianship. In response to a cap
on all costs or foster care costs, a state may have no choice but
to dangerously limit intakes to care. In response to a cap on
long-term stays, a state could move children out of care safely
and quickly. In short, unlike a poorly structured global cap, a
cap on long-term costs encourages attainable reforms and lim-
its uncontrollable risks.
By requiring funding of long-term stays in foster care, but
shifting their costs to states, a system with limited reimburse-
ment for long-term foster care would spur reform of state fi-
nancing systems. Because states would bear a much larger
burden for long-term care, they would have much greater in-
centives to provide the funding for preventive services that
they do not now offer.296 States might respond by accelerating
the shift from per diem reimbursement toward capitated pay-
ments and from reliance on state agencies to nonprofit provid-
ers.297 Although publicly funded foster care must of course re-
main available, the proposed funding shift would encourage
state legislatures to provide state and nonprofit agencies with
both the resources and the incentives to move children from
long-term foster care.
A declining reimbursement system faces two difficult de-
sign issues, but neither is intractable. One question is whether
reimbursements for all children should decline over time.
There are two good arguments that states should be allowed, at
least for the foreseeable future, to exclude a limited share of
their caseloads from a declining reimbursement system. First,
such an exclusion would create a margin of error as reforms
proceed. Second, it would allow states to continue providing
295. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
297. For a description of some early moves in this direction, see Promoting
Adoption, supra note 154 (testimony of Dr. Fred Wulczyn) (describing success
of Home ReBuilder program in New York City in increasing discharge rates);
id. (testimony of Teresa Markowitz, Kansas Department of Social and Reha-
bilitation Services) (showing the early success of a similar program in Kansas
at achieving high reunification and low recidivism rates); id. (statement of
Richard E. Hoekstra, Michigan Family Independence Agency) (describing a
similar program in Michigan).
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long-term care and services to the small group of children for
whom reunification, adoption, and guardianship are not cur-
rently realistic options.298 The law should not discourage
states from continuing to care for these children.
It is a closer question whether to exclude children in kin-
ship care from a declining reimbursement scheme. These chil-
dren do appear to face fewer risks than children in nonkinship
care.299 Standing almost alone as an exclusion within a de-
clining rate system, however, the special treatment of kinship
care would create a powerful incentive for states to place chil-
dren in kinship homes, regardless of their suitability or per-
manency.300 There is, therefore, an argument for treating kin-
ship care like any other placement.
An exclusion for a form of subsidized guardianship would
protect the soundest kinship care providers. Legal guardian-
ship is a complex status, often utilized and subsidized among
kinship caregivers. In this situation, the guardian has
authority to act in loco parentis, but the biological parent re-
tains rights to visitation and to petition for custody.301 Though
less secure both legally and psychologically than adoption,
guardianship is far more permanent than foster care. For ex-
ample, the guardian must assume legal liability for the child
and can only lose custody on a "best interests" showing.302 The
full reimbursement of guardianship rather than kinship care
would thus help assure the permanency of the kinship place-
ment. Such reimbursement would not, however, assure suit-
ability, especially since guardians typically do not have access
to the same range of services as foster parents.303 Full reim-
bursement of guardianship would therefore require the in-
298. These are generally children with severe emotional problems on
whom the state now spends large amounts of money for "specialized foster
care" or, where that is not available, group care. See BARTH ET AL., supra note
91, at 179-92; Ramona L. Foley, The Insufficiency of Statutory Protections, in
WHEN DRUG ADDICTS HAVE CHILDREN, supra note 262, at 157-60.
299. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
301 See Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized Guardi-
anship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
441, 457-59 (1996); Carol W. Williams, Legal Guardianship, in WHEN DRUG
ADDICTS HAVE CHILDREN, supra note 262, at 229,231,233-36.
302. See Schwartz, supra note 301, at 463.
303. See BARTH ET AL., supra note 91, at 265; Williams, supra note 301, at
237. It is worth noting, though, that as a practical matter most kinship care-




creased support and monitoring that some commentators have
already proposed.304 With that shift accomplished, exclusion of
guardianship from a declining rate system would appropriately
tailor a kinship exception.
For the great majority of children, reunification, adoption,
or guardianship (subsidized or not) should be a real possibility,
and federal reimbursements should decline if states fail to so-
lidify one such option within a reasonable period of time. The
issue then is the rate of decline, over which three principles
should govern. First, rates of decline should be sensitive to
variations in children's sense of time: just as timetables for
hearings and termination of parental rights should vary with
age, timetables for reimbursement should also vary. Second,
because premature reunification is dangerous 305 and finding an
adoptive placement takes time, rates should remain stable for
a sufficient period of time to assure that children are not
rushed home prematurely. After that time, rates might regu-
larly decline to a much lower reimbursement rate than present
law provides. Finally, there must be lifetime per-child limits
on foster care reimbursement at the maximum rate, in order to
prevent states from returning children home for intentionally
brief and highly disruptive periods of time.306
Such a system is not without risks. It is possible that
states would not manage to lower long-term foster care use.
This would expose them to greater costs, which in turn would
produce political pressure for agencies to remove children from
care without regard to their welfare. At least four forces, how-
ever, would limit these risks. First, the exclusion of some chil-
dren from the scheme would provide a margin for error. Sec-
ond, judicial review of permanency decisions could provide a
check against some bad decisions. Third, precipitous reunifica-
tions are short-lived and ultimately save very little money.
Fourth, and most importantly, the second part of the new fi-
nancial mechanism, greater funding for services, would help
assure that agencies have not only the incentives to reduce
long-term care, but also the means to do so.
3046 See Williams, supra note 301, at 237. It would also require an addi-
tional change in federal law, since guardianship is not now federally reim-
bursed. See Schwartz, supra note 301, at 456.
305. See, e.g., Barth & Berry, supra note 100, at 337; infra note 320.
306. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp. 1998) (requiring a state to file a peti-




3. Increasing Support for Services
With the savings from reductions in reimbursements for
long-term foster care, Congress could finance a major expan-
sion of child welfare services. To prevent an explosion of costs,
such an expansion would have to be capped, and the need for a
cap presents the difficulties highlighted earlier. Keying pay-
ments to the number of children entering foster care would
best approximate state services needs and, unlike using the to-
tal number of children in foster care, would not encourage
states to retain children in care. On the other hand, keying
funding to entries would create an incentive for states to take
children into care. Because intake itself is costly 307 and the
payment contingent on entries would be only a limited bonus,
however, this perverse incentive would be weaker than when
the total budget turns on the caseload size. If this perverse in-
centive remains a concern, however, the bonus payment could
be limited and combined with an increase in funding for child
welfare services under the two subparts of Title IV-B.308
Several technical modifications in the Title IV-B services
program would be necessary to improve services. First, the two
subparts of that title, Child Welfare Services and Family Pres-
ervation and Support, should be combined in a single services
grant. This would reduce compliance costs and improve pro-
gram quality nationwide. Within the second subpart, half of
the program-family preservation-has proven less successful
than other interventions 309 and should not receive special fed-
eral aid. The other half-family support-does not attempt to
assist children at greatest risk of foster placement.310 Such
services may be very valuable socially, but they do not reduce
foster care drift, an especially urgent goal in a reformed sys-
tem. With half of the second subpart no longer favored and the
other half either funded separately or not at all, the two parts
of Title IV-B could be combined to form a single program sup-
porting the full range of preservation, reunification, treatment,
long-term homemaking, and adoption services for at-risk chil-
dren. Because of the close link between destitution and child
307. See Giovannoni & Meezan, supra note 282, at 465-67; Kamerman &
Kahn, supra note 282, at 9-10.
308. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 621-629 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (child welfare services
and payment to states).
309. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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maltreatment, 311 the allocation principle within that grant pro-
gram should be a measure of poverty, such as the percentage of
children receiving food stamps used in the family support and
preservation program,312 not the per capita income measure
that is used in the general services program.313 Finally, for all
proposed funding increases, the law should contain mainte-
nance-of-effort provisions to ensure that states do not simply
substitute federal funding for state funding.
If the risks of reduced foster care funding appear too great,
then some of these services funds might also be made available
for foster care. Such a measure has serious costs, however.
States would be at less risk, but they would also have less in-
centive to move away from their current misallocation of re-
sources. The result would approximate the current reim-
bursement of foster care for long periods of time, with some
flexibility to transfer some funds into services. That would be
an advance, but it would be much smaller than the effect of re-
quiring services funding to be spent on services. The one risk
of the proposed system-that it will disrupt state reliance on
long-term foster care-also offers its greatest rewards.
B. OVERHAULING PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Financial reforms would give states concrete incentives to
follow the timetables in ASFA. Bearing more of the costs of
long-term care, state officials could not so easily allow tempo-
rary foster care to continue from hearing to hearing. Nor could
they use the exceptions to the termination provision to strand
children in care. Because states are more likely to implement
the mandatory timetables, correcting the errors contained
within them becomes imperative. Timetables remain sound
ideas, and the following discussion suggests four ways to im-
prove them.
1. Respecting the Child's Sense of Time
One minor change would set the tone for enforcement. To
help child welfare workers focus on the child's sense of time,
the law should run the period prior to permanency hearing and
termination petition from the date of the child's removal from
31L See COSTIN IT AL., supra note 24, at 149-51.
312. See 42 U.S.C. § 629c(c)(2) (Supp. 1998).
313. See id. § 621(b) (1991).
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the home, not from the hearing on neglect.314 Reunification ef-
forts should generally begin prior to a neglect hearing. The
child's difficulty with separation and need for permanency be-
gin with her removal from the home, not with the hearing. The
law should focus on the removal.
2. Taking Age into Account
The law should treat children differently at different ages.
This differential treatment would help assure that young chil-
dren do not suffer psychologically or lose adoption opportuni-
ties due to needless delays, and that older children do not suf-
fer terminations for which they are not ready and from which
they may not benefit. Beyond these immediate results, age-
sensitive timetables would signal to child welfare workers that
children's different developmental timelines matter. Both the
termination timeline and the schedule of permanency hearings
should take age into account.
The more complex issue is termination timetables. With
regard to age distinctions, child development experts suggest
that age three is often a critical point at which children become
more able to handle longer periods of separation from their
parents.315 The evidence of a precipitous decline in adoption
rates for children entering foster care after age one might seem
to suggest that terminations of even younger children should
not be expedited. That collapse occurs, however, notwith-
standing current delays of months or years while state agen-
cies decide on an adoptive placement, seek to terminate paren-
tal rights, and obtain the termination and adoption decrees.
3 16
Even with those delays, children between ages one and four are
still adopted substantially faster than older children.3 17 Chil-
dren who enter care before age three could be adopted in con-
siderably larger numbers if their termination processes were
accelerated.
314. For discussion of the current rule, see supra notes 195-97 and accom-
panying text.
315. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 105-06; Wald, supra note 95,
at 689-92. This discussion is generally indebted to these authors, especially
Wald.
316. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 144, at 7 fig.3
(showing that the time from entry to care until adoption ranges from 30 to 108
months, and that the time from the identification of adoption as the perma-
nency plan to adoption ranges from 24 to 54 months).
317. See BARTH ETAL., supra note 91, at 159-60 tbls.7.1-7.2.
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As to the appropriate time periods, a sensible deadline for
very young children would be one year after entry into care.
Two factors counsel a very short timetable: the harm to infants
after very brief periods of loss 318 and the precipitous drop in re-
unification rates after even four months in foster care.319 But
the increased rate of return into foster care after reunifications
from foster care stays of less than ninety days suggests that
the timeline should not push reunification too quickly.320 One
year is an adequate period to protect children and provide
services to parents.321 For older children, a sensible period
would be eighteen months. That timetable incorporates the
lesser harms from foster care and the greater tenacity of the
older child's bonds to her parents. The longer delay would also
prevent states from wasting limited legal resources on ad-
dressing inessential termination petitions.
As the law accelerates deadlines to termination for
younger children, it should also accelerate their permanency
hearings. With increased pressure to find permanent place-
ments quickly, such hearings would become more critical so
that agencies understand parents' needs and parents under-
stand agencies' expectations. It would make sense to hold the
hearings after six months in care for children under three
years of age. Occurring three or six months before the decision
318. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 105; Wald, supra note 95, at
689-92.
319. See Courtney, supra note 110, at 90 fig.l.
320. Many studies, but not all, show that three months is both a minimum
safe period in foster care and the maximum period needed to minimize the
risk of recidivism. See Courtney, supra note 110, at 236 (showing that chil-
dren who had stays in care less than three months had higher rates of reentry
than other children, but that after a few months in care, additional time had
no effect on recidivism); Fred Wulczyn, Caseload Dynamics and Foster Care
Reentry, 65 Soc. SERV. REv. 133, 147 (1991) (showing a similarly high recidi-
vism rate among children returned home after less than 90 days and much
lower rates for children returned home in any period later). But see Barth &
Berry, supra note 100, at 337 (showing higher recidivism rates for children
returned home after 3-to-6 months than among those returned after 6 to 12
months). Although troubling, the difference in the last study was a 29% re-
cidivism rate for the faster group and 19% for the slower group, and as there
was no disaggregation of the groups by months in care, the actual difference
in rates between the groups with nine- and twelve-month stays may have
been quite small. See id. The studies show no increase in safety from more
than a year in foster care. See id.
321. See also infra note 323 (discussing possibility of one-time extension
for parents of infants).
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on a termination petition, such a hearing would provide clearer
notice to all parties of the state's plans for the child.
3. Scrutinizing Permanency Decisions
Although financial reform would limit the temptation for
state agencies to minimize their workloads by unthinkingly
finding an exception to the mandatory termination provision,
two additional reforms would further curtail such arbitrary
discretion. First, though state agencies should be allowed not
to seek termination of parental rights based on the child's best
interests, these agencies should be required to identify specific
conditions justifying that decision. Given the state-specificity
and complexity of many issues in the termination process,
Congress cannot dictate a complete list of criteria to states.
322
However, to assure that agencies' discretion is channeled, the
federal government should, as Michael Wald has suggested, es-
tablish a broad list of acceptable criteria for declining to termi-
nate parental rights from which states could choose.
323
322. The debate over an "adoptability" criterion is a good example of an
issue both too contested and too complex for federal law to handle. Even ad-
vocates who join in favoring adoption disagree about its merits. Compare
Wald, supra note 95, at 699 (advocating adoptability criterion in order to
avoid needless terminations) with Barth, supra note 111, at 304 (arguing that
the risk of creating "legal orphans" through terminations absent an
adoptability criterion is outweighed by the risk of creating "de facto orphans"
by refusing to terminate parental rights).
Adoptability inquiries can also be structured in very different ways.
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 144, at 16-17. For exam-
ple, some states grant terminations of parental rights that are conditional
upon the finding of an adoptive placement. See id. at 16. Along similar lines,
a mandatory filing system could require states to demonstrate that they have
vigorously sought to identify an adoptive home prior to the decision not to
terminate parental rights. The law would need to specify the elements of the
vigorous search and the minimum time period in which they must occur, and
the proof of such search would have to be reviewable by the child's advocate
and by the court. To assure that states did engage in such search efforts in
advance through "concurrent planning," the statute would have to require
that states failing to make such efforts prior to the deadline proceed with a
termination petition while those efforts occur, and that the adoptability de-
termination be made later on. As these reflections suggest, the issue is too
complex to be handled in a one-size-fits-all fashion by federal law.
323. See Wald, supra note 95, at 696-99 (listing as criteria for avoiding
mandatory timetable strength of parent-child relationship, placement with
kin who do not wish to adopt, children's need for special treatment, child's de-
sires, and availability of adoptive parent). To this list should be added place-
ment with a permanent guardian and, in view of the short period proposed for
services prior to termination, in the case of infants a strong likelihood that
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In a second reform of the mandatory termination process,
state agencies should be required to do more than make the
basis of their decision "available for court review."324 That
availability provides little assurance of meaningful judicial
scrutiny.325 Rather, at the permanency hearing prior to the
termination deadline (for an infant, after six months in care
prior to the nine-month deadline, and for an older child after
twelve months in care prior to eighteen months), all parties
should be able to demand a judicial ruling on whether to pro-
ceed with termination. That ruling would not anticipate the
termination decree any more than a probable cause determina-
tion in a criminal case establishes guilt.326 In both instances,
the rule simply means that the executive branch must submit
to judicial review before depriving an individual of a presump-
tive right-whether freedom from seizure, or a permanent
home after some time in care.
4. Limiting the "Reasonable Efforts" Exception to the
Termination Timetable
With the expansion of funding for reunification efforts, the
argument for the reasonable efforts requirement in the termi-
nation process would become stronger. As states increase
funding for supportive services, social workers would become
more able to provide these services and more tractable if they
did not. Moreover, with a limited timetable for full foster care
reimbursement, agencies might otherwise have a new incentive
to find the first available permanent placement, even if it were
an improper adoption for an easily adopted child. For these
reasons, a reasonable efforts prerequisite to termination would
have a more useful incentive effect.
At the same time, federal law should cabin the reasonable
efforts exception to achieve its purpose. Each state should be
required to define the reasonable efforts that every state
agency can plausibly offer. State judges should then be re-
quired to use early permanency or neglect hearings to identify
the reasonable efforts that agencies must supply. An exception
reunification can occur within a fixed period of approximately sixty days (with
an extension to be available only once).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii) (Supp. 1998).
325. See supra notes 219, 221, 231 and accompanying text.
326. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (requiring a prompt
"determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to [pretrial] detention" fol-
lowing a warrantless arrest).
698 [Vol. 83:637
DRIFTING THROUGH BYZANTIUM
to the termination timetable should only be available when an
agency has failed to provide services that it could have sup-
plied and knew it should have supplied. Even when the excep-
tion applies, the timeline for these efforts should automatically
begin to run again with the provision of those efforts. These
narrowing steps would assure that the reasonable efforts re-
quirement operates as a meaningful incentive, not an unat-
tainable standard.
C. SUMMARY
These reforms seek to be softhearted and hardheaded.
They would realign federal procedures with children's needs in
a way that respects children's different senses of time and dif-
ferent opportunities. At the same time, the proposals would
reconnect federal funding with federal goals, breaking down
the financial and ideological barriers to giving children more
permanent homes. The reforms certainly involve risks. But
they might fulfill ASFA's promise.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the framers of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act had the right goals but produced the
wrong vehicle for achieving them. In a system seized by so
much inertia, ASFA's procedural reforms are too poorly drafted
and narrowly focused to encourage the right systemic change.
Reforms that are financially bolder yet substantively more pre-
cise promise permanency for more children in a more timely
manner.
Because these proposed reforms would alter the system
more dramatically, they invite rethinking of a question de-
flected at the beginning of this Article: did Congress really
mean to put "children's rights" ahead of "parents' rights?"
327
An adult-oriented sense of justice does stand behind ASFA's
procedural failures to protect children's interests, especially
the overly broad exceptions to the termination provision and
327. A large literature questions the utility of this distinction. See, e.g.,
RENNY GOLDEN, DISPOSABLE CHILDREN: AMERICA'S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
153 (1997); Anthony N. Maluccio et al., Protecting Children by Preserving
Their Families, 16 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 295 (1994). As the following
paragraphs show, these perspectives in my view exaggerate the overlap be-
tween parents' and children's needs, at least in the cases that enter the child




the insensitivity to children's ages. But ASFA's other mistake,
its failure to reform system financing, actually works against
parents by reducing the services available to them. Only a por-
tion of ASFA's failure to serve children thus reflects enduring
concern for parental rights.
To the extent that justice toward parents is still a value in
ASFA, this Article may appear unfaithful to the Act's purposes.
However, it is worth considering the effects of the proposed
child-oriented reforms for parents. In some important ways,
these reforms would better serve adults than does ASFA. Cur-
rent law tacitly reflects a nonsensical compromise: the children
do not go home, the state does not terminate parental rights,
and long-term foster care results. This outcome does not serve
anyone's best interests. Children do not achieve permanency,
and parents do not regain custody. The proposed reforms
would offer both parents and children better results. Children
would have more hope of permanency, ideally with their par-
ents but otherwise elsewhere, and parents would have more
help regaining custody of their children. In some measure,
therefore, this Article advances children's interests and par-
ents' interests in tandem.
Yet the scope of this confluence should not be overstated.
When parents cannot use available assistance to regain cus-
tody, then under the proposed reform they would lose their
rights more quickly than under ASFA. The availability of sup-
portive services may satisfy some observers that parents' fail-
ures are "their fault" and hence no longer the law's legitimate
concern. But that is a facile response. The parental failures
may also reflect systemic injustices-especially the pressures
of poverty-which the services do nothing to reduce.328 The
child-oriented proposals in this Article are thus in some ten-
sion with ASFA's quiet steps to safeguard parental interests.
That objection ultimately goes beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion, though. This Article has examined child welfare law
froma the perspective of Congress's stated goals, not its ambigu-
ous actions. 329 And what Congress has said-that the child's
interests are paramount-has deep roots in our politics, our
culture, and our private lives.330 Congress's deeds would be
328. See supra note 21 and sources cited therein (discussing limits of re-
sidual approach).
329. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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true to its words if the child welfare system actually put chil-
dren first. This Article has suggested some modest steps to-
ward that goal.

